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ABSTRACT
This thesis studies the off-farm labor supply decision of farm operators and their spouses
in the United States. The data used in this study is from the Agricultural Resource Management
survey, 2006. The objective of this study is twofold. First, to identify those factors that affect offfarm labor supply of farm operators and their spouses. In particular, this study investigates the
impact of human capital of farm operators and spouses, personal, family, farm and location
characteristics on labor allocation for on- and off-farm work. Empirical results indicate that farm
operators’ and their spouses’ human capital are positively correlated with off-farm labor supply.
In addition, the number of children in a household is inversely related to a spouse’s off-farm
employment. Similarly, a household’s net worth and farm size have a negative impact on offfarm labor allocation decisions by both farm operators and their spouses. Payments from
government programs have a negative effect on labor allocation for non-farm work. The
availability of health insurance to farm operators and their spouses from off-farm employment
has a positive effect on labor supply for off-farm work.
The second objective of this study is to compare results obtained from a parametric probit
model and a semiparametric additive probit model of off-farm labor supply by farm operators
and spouses. One of the most important aspects of semiparametric analysis is to identify
smoothing or nonparametric variables in a regression model. The Blundell and Duncan (1998)
approach shows that farm size is such a smoothing variable in the off-farm labor supply model.
A semiparametric additive regression model identifies a few significant covariates as compared
to a parametric probit model; however, the Hong and White (1995) specification test and
likelihood ratio test favor a semiparametric model in this study. In particular, the graphical plots
of fitted values from parametric and semiparametric models also show that a semiparametric
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model is preferred. The semiparametric model helps to formulate appropriate functional form of
off-farm labor supply in the United States, which might be the subject of further study of this
research.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
According to United States Department of Agriculture (USDA, 2005), agricultural
production commands an overall smaller share in both the national and rural economies of the
United States. Agricultural industries contribute 2.5 percent of the U.S.’s gross domestic product
(GDP). A report written by Dimitri, Effland and Conklin (2005) shows that American agriculture
has undergone a tremendous transformation in the 20th century in terms of the structure of farms
and farm households including off-farm work. Decision makers, mainly farm operators and their
spouses, are providers of agricultural labor. Table 1 shows the number of farms, total farm
acreage, gross farm income and net farm income in the United States from 1950 to 2007. Over
that time, the number of farms has decreased by almost 80 percent over the past six decades.
Similarly, the data shows a decrease in the overall amount of acreage in farms. For example, the
total acreage of land devoted to farming in 2007 was 930 million acres, a nearly 23 percent
decrease in acreage since 1950. The number of farm operators decreased by 68 percent over the
same period.
Some of the main factors that have caused these transformations are low price and
income elasticities for agricultural products and technological advancement, which, suggests that
the supply of agricultural products has outpaced the growth in demand for these products. The
increase in the relative wage rate in non-farm sectors is also responsible for the reallocation of
farm labor in non-farm sectors. As a result, labor demand in the farm sector was declined. These
changes resulted in a decrease in the number of farm operators and an increase in the total
number of hours worked off-farm by farm operators. According to the 2007 Census of
Agriculture, more than 65 percent of farm operators worked off the farm.
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Table 1. Selected Statistics of Farms in the United States, 1950-2008
Net Farm
Year
Farms
Land In Farms
Income
(000)
($000)

Gross Farm
Income
($000)

1950

5,647,800

1,202,019

13,634

33,089

1951

5,427,600

1,203,500

15,909

38,257

1952

5,197,500

1,204,930

14,945

37,735

1953

4,983,600

1,205,740

12,961

34,429

1954

4,798,200

1,206,355

12,365

34,174

1955

4,653,800

1,201,900

11,277

33,448

1956

4,514,100

1,197,070

11,242

33,948

1957

4,371,700

1,191,340

11,063

34,765

1958

4,232,900

1,184,944

13,179

38,969

1959

4,104,520

1,182,563

10,707

37,885

1960

3,962,520

1,175,646

11,212

38,588

1961

3,825,410

1,167,699

11,957

40,547

1962

3,692,410

1,159,383

12,064

42,343

1963

3,572,200

1,151,572

11,770

43,369

1964

3,456,690

1,146,106

10,492

42,304

1965

3,356,170

1,139,597

12,899

46,549

1966

3,257,040

1,131,844

13,960

50,468

1967

3,161,730

1,123,456

12,339

50,520

1968

3,070,860

1,115,231

12,322

51,847

1969

3,000,180

1,107,811

14,293

56,408

1970

2,949,140

1,102,371

14,366

58,818

1971

2,902,310

1,096,863

15,012

62,118

1972

2,859,880

1,092,065

19,455

71,143

1973

2,823,260

1,087,923

34,356

98,910

1974

2,795,460

1,084,433

27,267

98,247

1975

2,521,420

1,059,420

25,510

100,554

1976

2,497,270

1,054,075

20,175

102,917

1977

2,455,830

1,047,785

19,881

108,766
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Table 1. Contd.
Year

Farms

Land In Farms

Net Farm Income

Gross Farm Income

(000)

($000)

($000)

1978

2,436,250

1,044,790

25,198

128,447

1979

2,437,300

1,042,015

27,415

150,720

1980

2,439,510

1,038,885

16,141

149,280

1981

2,439,920

1,034,190

26,879

166,323

1982

2,406,550

1,027,795

23,841

164,146

1983

2,378,620

1,023,425

14,262

153,855

1984

2,333,810

1,017,803

25,975

167,981

1985

2,292,530

1,012,073

28,509

161,069

1986

2,249,820

1,005,333

31,117

156,125

1987

2,212,960

998,923

38,005

168,408

1988

2,200,940

994,423

39,633

177,916

1989

2,174,520

990,723

46,487

191,603

1990

2,145,820

986,850

46,261

197,795

1991

2,116,760

981,736

40,234

192,049

1992

2,107,840

978,503

50,171

200,555

1993

2,201,590

968,845

46,725

205,022

1994

2,197,690

965,935

52,567

216,107

1995

2,196,400

962,515

39,771

210,833

1996

2,190,500

958,675

58,936

235,807

1997

2,190,510

956,010

51,306

238,029

1998

2,192,330

952,080

47,119

232,592

1999

2,187,280

948,460

47,690

234,934

2000

2,166,780

945,080

50,569

243,622

2001

2,148,630

942,070

54,874

251,779

2002

2,135,360

940,300

39,594

232,649

2003

2,126,860

936,750

60,462

260,047

2004

2,112,970

932,260

85,801

295,638

2005

2,098,690

927,940

79,335

301,105
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Table 1. Contd.
Year

Farms

Land In Farms

Net Farm Income

Gross Farm Income

(000)

($000)

($000)

2006

2,088,790

925,790

58,509

292,380

2007

2,204,950

921,460

86,778

341,148

2008
2,200,000
919,900
89,320
379,905
Source: Economic Research Services, U.S. Department of Agriculture (1950-2008) and
Mishra (1996)

Furthermore, almost forty percent of farm operators worked off-farm 200 days or more in
2007. Hence, off-farm employment is an integral part of the agricultural transformation, and is
one of the most remarkable changes in agricultural production. The income earned from off-farm
wages and salaries accounted for nearly 80% of total farm household income. (Mishra et al.,
2002). This income is important for the economic well-being of these households. Off-farm
income appears to smooth household income (Mishra and Goodwin, 1997; Mishra and Sandretto,
2002) and most farmers view off-farm work as permanent rather than just a temporary or
transitional pursuit (Ahearn, Perry, El-Osta, 1993). In addition, growth of off-farm income over
the past four decades has significantly reduced income inequality between both farm and nonfarm households (Gardner, 2002).
The above discussion shows that, like non-farm industries, many farm households
(operator and spouse) are dual career households with respect to income sources (farm and offfarm). The alternative source of off-farm income (or off-farm hours) varies by farm size, region,
farm characteristics, and the human capital of operators and spouses. According to FernandezCornejo (2007), off-farm income varies inversely with farm size; i.e. operators of smaller farms
have higher off-farm income than large farms. This is due to greater off-farm employment for
operators of small farms (Mishra and Goodwin, 1997).
4

Government farm programs affect the labor allocation decision by farm operators and
their spouses. Although several farm policies have been introduced since 1933, the Federal
Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 replaced the traditional price support program
with a system of direct payments based on historical production with one of complete planting
flexibility. The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 introduced a counter-cyclical
payments program that paid farmers on historical production for times when market prices fall
below a pre-specified target level. For example, peanut producers are qualified to receive
counter-cyclical payments when market price falls below the target price of $495 per ton during
1998-2001. Whether government policies influence the time allocation decisions of farm
operators is an important issue in the study of farm household behavior.
From an econometric estimation approach, most of the research in off-farm labor supply
functions has focused primarily on parametric functional forms. An alternative approach is
semiparametric functional form. A semiparametric model is more flexible in estimation than the
nonparametric model, because the sample size required to obtain reliable estimates is not as large
the sample size required for a parametric model and it captures the non-linearity of covariates.
Goodwin and Holt (2002) use semiparametric model to study off-farm labor supply of agrarian
households in transition in Bulgaria.
1.1. Objectives
The main objective of this study is to estimate the off-farm labor supply model of farm
operators and their spouses using a semiparametric methodology. The study presented here also
discusses the advantages and disadvantages of both traditional and semiparametric estimation
procedures. This study find parameter estimates using probit estimation and generalized additive
semiparametric model. Finally, a Hong and White test is used to compare results of the
5

parametric and the semiparametric models. Thus, the researchers, who are interested in the study
of functional form of off-farm labor supply, can be benefited to apply appropriate functional
form.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Numerous studies of agriculture and farm households have shown that changes have
occurred in the structure of U.S. agriculture. For example, Gebremdhin and Christy (1996)
illustrated the transformation of the structure of production agriculture using a descriptive
analysis. They focused on the implications of structural changes on resource usage, population
distribution in rural communities, and the survival of small farms. Gebremdhin and Christy
(1996) argue that this structural change in agriculture is not a temporary phenomenon. One of the
structural changes is that farm operators report more off-farm work. The term ‘off-farm work’ is
described in many different ways by different economists, for example Fuguitt (1959) described
off-farm work as a “push-pull” hypothesis and concluded that off-farm employment is directly
related to off-farm opportunities and inversely related to opportunities in farming.
Previous studies were done using utility maximization subject to budget constraints
(Bollman, 1979). Huffman (1980) studied off-farm labor supply in Iowa, North Carolina, and
Oklahoma using household utility maximization as its objective, subject to constraints on time,
income, and farm production. Using these three factors (a vector of time endowments of family
members, allocated between farm work, off-farm work, and leisure; household income received
by members through off-farm work, and a vector of farm production), Huffman (1980)
concluded that off-farm labor supply is directly related to operators’ education and extension
inputs. His result also implied that farmers who attain more education tend to reallocate their
labor services from self-employed farm work to off-farm work faster than less educated farmers.
A study of farm operators in Dodge Country, Georgia (Barlett, 1986), claimed that the
primary reason farmers choose to work off-farm is due to the variability associated with farm
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income. However, Barlett (1986) did not use any empirical methodology to reach this
conclusion. Supporting this view, Mishra and Goodwin (1997) found that the off-farm labor
supply of farmers was positively correlated with the variability in their farm income. Mishra and
Sandretto (2002) found that even though real net farm income has been declining over the past
fifty years, income variability has declined over that same time period on either the aggregate or
per-farm basis. This evidence suggests that the declining mean income and its high variability
are a major shift in labor decisions of farm households.
Perhaps off-farm income reduces the impacts of these problems. For example, Mishra
and Sandretto (2002) show that off-farm income has contributed significantly to raising the level
of and reducing the variability in farm household incomes. Furthermore, Mishra and El-Osta
(2001) agreed with previous studies in concluding that the farm income component is the
primary source of variability in total farm household income for those farms participating in
federal commodity programs, while the major source of income variability for nonparticipating
households is income from off-farm sources. Empirical results obtained by Mishra and
Holthausen (2002) confirms that, as expected, variability in farm income and off-farm incomes
have a positive and negative effect, respectively, on off-farm hours worked by farm operators.
Kwon, Orazem, and Otto, (2006) found that Iowa farm couples adjust their off-farm labor supply
in response to both permanent and transitory farm income shocks.
Human capital plays an important role in off-farm labor supply (Bollman 1979).
Investment in education increases the human capital of individuals. Korb (1999) indicated that
younger, better-educated farmers and their spouses are most likely to work off-farm. Although,
Furtan, Van Kooten and Thompson (1985), and Huffman and Lange (1989) found education
elasticities of wages for both men and women to be inelastic. Huffman (1980) found a positive
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elasticity and a significant direct effect of education on the number of days worked off-farm. In
addition, education influence off-farm labor supply (e.g. Gould and Saupe, 1989; Huffman and
El-Osta, 1997; Thompson, 1985; Goodwin and Holt, 2002). Gould and Saupe (1989) concluded
that vocational training increased the probability of off-farm work. Yang (1997) states that
knowledge sharing within a household is a cause of educational selectivity of off-farm family
labor supply. El-Osta, Mishra and Morehart (2008) found that educational attainment of the
spouse to be positively related with the decision of the wife to work off-farm.
Experience (both on and off-farm) is another factor affecting labor supply. Past research
shows that experience working off-farm has a positive effect on off-farm labor supply. For
example, Sumner (1982) found that the off-farm work experience is positive and inelastic. Lass,
Findeis and Hellberg (1991) find similar result. Alternatively, some economists find that farming
experience affects off-farm labor supply directly through the labor supply function and indirectly
through farm production. Furtan, Van Kooten and Thompson (1985) estimated the direct impact
of farming experience on the off-farm labor supply and found it to be negative and statistically
significant. Mishra and Goodwin (1997) concluded that farmers with more farming experience
were less likely to work off the farm. They also found that the off-farm labor supply of farmers
and their spouses was positively correlated with off-farm experience. Goodwin and Holt (2002)
also support previous findings that previous off-farm experience farm operators were more likely
to work off the farm.
Family and location characteristics such as the number of children in the household and
household net worth play a vital role in affecting off-farm labor supply. Since most farm
operator’s spouses are female, who were traditionally responsible for taking care of the
household’s children. It is likely that the number of children in a household determines whether
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an operator’s wife works on- or off-farm. Furtan, Van Kooten and Thompson (1985) concluded
that the total number of children has a negative effect on the number of off-farm work hours
supplied by farm wives. Thompson (1985) separated children into two age groups; 6-12 years
and 12 years or more. She found that the first group reduces the number of hours worked off the
farm by spouses. Gould and Saupe (1989) found that number of children under six years old had
a significant negative effect on the probability of the spouse’s off-farm work. Further, they
concluded that marginal value of the spouse’s home time due to a child’s birth increased
households work decreasing off-farm work. Mishra and Goodwin (1997), El-Osta, Mishra, and
Morehart, (2008), and Goodwin and Holt (2002) draw similar conclusions from their research on
off farm work by the female spouse of the farm operator.
The effect that the number of children have on the off labor supply of male farmers is not
conclusive. Huffman (1980) found that the number of children who were less than five years of
age significantly increased the off-farm labor supply of farm operators. Furtan, Van Kooten, and
Thompson (1985) concluded that for each additional child, the hours worked off-farm by a
farmer increased by 11%. From these findings, one can conclude that more children perhaps
require the farmer to seek off-farm income, so farm operators are more likely to work off-farm.
Furthermore, using a family farm survey conducted in Israel, Kimihi (2004) concluded that both
fathers and mothers tended to reduce their participation in off-farm work as the number of
children rose. However, Kimihi (1994) also found that farm couples are more likely to work off
the farm when the number of other adults in the household increased, because adults might be
able to help some farm and household work.
Government farm programs started in 1933 as part of the Agricultural Adjustment Act
(AAA). The first farm bill proposed to establish a ‘New Deal’ mix of commodity-specific price
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and income support programs. In 1985, the U.S. government enacted the Food Security Act
(1985) that introduced marketing load provisions to commodity loan programs by allowing the
repayment of loans at lower rates when market prices fell. This was done with the intention of
both aiding U.S. farmers and in reducing government-held surplus.
Mishra and Goodwin (1997), El-Osta and Ahearn (1996) found that off-farm work by
farm operators and their spouses were significantly correlated with receipts of government
payments. The U.S. government introduced the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform
Act (FAIR) in 1996 known as ‘freedom to farm’, will stipulated that government payments are
not tied to production. The FAIR Act pertains to use fixed “Production Flexibility Contract”
(PFC) or “Agricultural Market Transition Act (AMTA) payments and described as decoupled
payments (El-Osta, Mishra and Ahearn, 2004; Ahearn, El-Osta and Dewbre, 2006). Decoupled
payments are not related to a farmer’s current production, output levels or market conditions
(e.g., price), so these payments do not have a direct effect on production decisions for specific
commodities, i.e. the payments would be expected to only have a wealth effect.
The motivation for introducing AMTA/PFC payments is to minimize the trade-distorting
impact of traditional coupled farm commodity payments. These payments play an important role
in off-farm labor supply (Ahearn, El-Osta and Dewbre, 2006). Although Ahearn, El-Osta and
Dewbre (2002) did not find any difference in the impact of coupled payments in the decision to
participate in working off the farm, Dewbre and Mishra (2007) concluded that transition
payments increased leisure hours for both farm operators and their spouses. El-Osta, Mishra, and
Ahearn (2004) analyzed separately the effect of coupled and decoupled payments on off-farm
labor supply and found that both types of government payments tended to increase the number of
hours operators worked on farm and decreased the hours they work off the farm. Ahearn El-Osta
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and Dewbre (2006) concluded that the increase in off-farm participation of farm operators who
received payments was not the result of the 1996 policy change, instead it was due to the
continuation of the long-term trend of a greater reliance on off-farm work by farm households.
Other payments (whether coupled or decoupled) have a negative effect on off-farm labor
participation. Dewbre and Mishra (2007) also found that AMTA payments increased leisure
hours for both farm operators and their spouses.
In 2008, El-Osta, Mishra, and Morehart (2008) found that total government payments are
an important factor in decreasing the likelihood of off-farm work strategies involving work by a
husband or a wife or both (husband and wife). In addition, they found that the marginal impact of
this payment on the probability of the wife working off the farm alone is found to be positive.
Hennessy and Rehman (2008), using data from Irish farmers, found that the decoupling of direct
payments increases the probability of a farmer obtain the U.S. off-farm employment as well as
the amount of time allocated to working off-farm. A recent study of the U.S. farmer by Key and
Roberts (2009) found that farmers with decreasing marginal utility of income responded to
higher decoupled payments by decreasing off-farm labor and increasing farm labor, which
subsequently resulted in greater agricultural output.
The AMTA payment under the FAIR act (1996) was supposed to last for seven years,
however, periods of low prices and localized yield short falls during the late 1990’s led Congress
to pass a supplemental payments programs for farmers in 2002. The payment, also known as
“Market Loss Assistance” (MLA) payments, was based on historical base acreage; and
consequently this payment classified as a ‘decoupled’ payment. Ad hoc market loss assistance
payments started into farm legislation in the form of “Counter-Cyclical Payments” (CCP) to
institutionalize Market Loss Assistance payments. Using a farm household resource allocation
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model and Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS), Dewbre and Mishra (2007)
found that loan deficiency payments (LDP) and MLA payments reduced leisure. Dewbre and
Mishra (2007) also found that AMTA payments exhibited a much higher degree of income
transfer efficiency than did either LDP or MLA payments. Thus, different governmental farm
payments have differing effects on the allocation of labor by operators and spouses between farm
and non-farm sectors.
Another factor that influences the allocation of labor supply between on and off-farm
activities is farm type. Off-farm work is less likely for those farms, which are relatively laborintensive enterprises like dairy farms (Leistritz et al., 1985) and other types of operations
involving livestock (Lass, Findeis and Hallberg, 1991). In contrast, Futan, Van Kooten and
Thompson (1985) found that the presence of livestock enterprises reduced off-farm labor supply
by 41% for the United States. Their model, however, did not account for differences between
dairy and beef cattle operations. In contrast, Lass and Gempeaswa (1992) concluded that farm
type had little impact on off-farm labor supply when operators’ and their spouses’ off-farm labor
supply function are jointly estimated. Off-farm hours worked, however, are significantly lower
for dairy farmers when only the operator works off-farm. Kilkenny (1993) and Kimhi (1994)
found that participation in off-farm labor markets differs across farm type and family structure,
which support the previous results.
Farm size also has an impact on labor allocation decisions. Operators of small farms
typically participate more in off-farm employment activities, work more hours off the farm, and
have higher off-farm income than do operators of larger farms (Fernandez-Cornejo, Hendricks
and Mishra, 2005). Mishra and Goodwin (1997) indicate that farm size affects labor allocation
decisions. They found that an inverse relationship exists between farm size and off-farm work.
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The availability of insurance for farm products is also another important determining
factor that influences the off-farm labor market. Key, Roberts and O’Donoghoue (2006) found
that greater crop insurance coverage reduces the off-farm labor supply of operators who
produced at least $1,000,000 of output, and increased the labor supply of small-farm operators
who produced less than $25,000 of output.
2.1. Functional Forms of Off-farm Labor Supply
With regard to functional forms of off-farm labor supply, most studies have used
parametric models. For example, during the 1970s, Theil (1971), Larson and Yu Hu (1977), and
Sexton (1975) used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to estimate the off-farm labor supply
function. Sumner (1982) applied simple regression to study off-farm labor supply by farm
operators. Gould and Saupe (1989) used the same procedure to study hours of off-farm work. In
addition, they used a maximum likelihood probit model to study the benefit associated with offfarm labor supply. Gould and Saupe (1989) used a bivariate probit model to study entry and exit
off farm labor supply. Huffman (1980) used a logit estimation procedure to find the relationship
between off-farm work participation and explanatory variables. During the 1990’s, economists
Lass and Gempesaw (1992) used a univariate probit model with a random coefficient approach.
Kimhi and Lee (1996) used simultaneous equations, with ordered categorical dependent
variables, to study off-farm work decisions by farm couples. Mishra and Goodwin (1997) used a
Tobit estimation procedure to find the effect of farm income variability on the supply of off-farm
labor. These types of models continued to be used by researchers in following decades
(Phimister and Roberts, 2006; El-Osta, Mishra and Ahearn, 2004). Another methodology used in
decades that are more recent involve the use of bivariate probit models (Ahearn, El-Osta,
Dewbre, 2006), and multinomial logit estimation (El-Osta, Mishra and Morehart, 2008).
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Although, parametric models have been widely used in economic research, these
models have some structural weakness. One weakness of parametric models is that they require
strong assumptions regarding functional forms. The possibility of having nonlinear effects of
covariates and this assumption does not hold true in many cases. Second, sample sizes required
to estimate the coefficients accurately are large and available data are often not of sufficient size
to meet this requirement. Third, parametric models are balanced by misspecification problems
and a poorly specified model will leads to poor results. If semiparametric fit is more powerful than
the a linear of quadratic fit, it should be used. However, if there is little difference between parametric
and semiparametric fit, one can proceed with parametric fit (Keele 2008). A semiparametric estimation

procedure; however would be used to correct for these weaknesses. Nonparametric components
in a semiparametric distribution are distribution free, so a strong assumption such as function
form is not required. Second, it can be find better estimates while using smaller sample sizes.
Finally, the problem of misspecification is not commonly found when a semiparametric
methodology is employed. Overall, semiparametric functional form is better compared to
parametric and nonparametric model.
Semiparametric modeling was introduced following the work of Manski (1975). The
partial linear model, as proposed by Robinson (1988), is the simplest semiparametric model.
Although this type of model is used in many studies, there is limited use for it in labor supply
related models. Goodwin and Holt (2002) used a semiparametric model to study the farm labor
supply of a sample of agrarian households in Bulgaria, and found that it is consistent under
various distributional assumptions. They show that labor supply is positively affected by
education and work experience, which are hypothesized to increase off-farm wages. They
compare parametric and semiparametric estimates using Housman test and found that
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semiparametric modeling procedure better than estimates from simple parametric model
approach.
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CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL MODEL
3.1. Household Model
The agricultural household model provides a unifying microeconomic framework for
understanding agricultural households’ decisions on consumption, production, and time
allocation. This chapter presents the basic structure of the model, the theoretical underpinnings
and the empirical formulation of the model. The model of off-farm labor supply is based upon
the model as proposed by Mishra and Goodwin (1997), and Goodwin and Holt (2002).
Consider a household that consists of two members – a head of household and that head’s
spouse. Assume that each household member has an option for income generation, either in
agriculture (supplying F hours of labor to farming) and/or through off-farm employment
(supplying M hours of labor to the off-farm market). A household member allocates their time to
farm, off-farm, and leisure activities. It is assumed that perfect competition exists in the labor
market and, therefore, the farm operator’s labor allocation decision has no effect on aggregate
demand, supply, and price of labor. Under this condition, a farm operator obtains utility from the
consumption of goods, off-farm work, and on-farm work subject to budget and time constraints.
If a farm operator and spouse have multiple job choices, they will compare available options and
allocate their labor as to maximize total utility that implies equalizing marginal returns to labor
in an alternative job and in the consumption of leisure. Let H denote household Head and S
represents Spouse. Under the assumption of perfect information, I assume that the farm operator
maximizes utility having leisure
,

,

and the consumption of good

,

and express it as follows:
(3.1)

Subject to:
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,
,
0,

;

consumption goods;

;

,

refers to leisure time

refers to farm hours supplied;
represents total endowment of time;

,

;
,

;

refers to the off-farm
refers to off-farm work

; p represents the price of

represents the price of farm output; Q(.) is the farm output; is a column

vector of the price of other farm inputs;
represents non labor income;
,

(3.2)

0

,
,

,

(3.3)

where, q represents consumed good;

hours;

,

,

0,

wage rate

,

represents a column vector of other input quantities;

represents household characteristics;

represents human capital

.

The utility function is assumed to be concave and twice continuously differentiable. The
utility function varies according to operator and spouse characteristics, which is represented by k
in the above equation. The utility function has two restrictions. The level of consumption is the
sum of farm income, off-farm income, and exogenous non-labor income (budget constraint
equation, 3.2). Using farm labor (Fi), human capital (Ki), and other farm inputs (X) as inputs for
the production function Q(.) the farm produces output. The model assumes that the marginal
utilities of leisure and consumption of goods approach infinity as consumption approaches zero,
thus ensuring that positive levels of leisure and goods are always consumed (Goodwin and Holt,
2002). Equation (3.3) is the time constraint. Farm operators and spouses have fixed amount of
time to allocate among leisure time, farm work, and off-farm work. In general, time spent on
farm is always greater than zero
zero

0

0 , however, the optimal hours of off-farm work may be

since some farmers do not work off-farm. Under the assumption for the
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differentiable utility function, the optimality condition can be stated with the following
Langrangian function.
,

,

l

,

,

,

,

,
(3.4)

The Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions for maximizing the utility function subject to income,
time and nonnegativity constraints are:
0, for farm inputs

l

l

0,

l

l

0,

l

0,

l

0,

l

1, …
0,

(3. 6)

0,

l
l

(3.5)

(3.7)
0,
0,

0,

(3.8)
(3.9)
(3.10)

0,

(3.11)

0,

(3.12)

Where l and g represents Langrange multipliers for the household’s income and individual’s
time allocation. If an interior solution exists (implying that both the head and spouse work on
and off-farm), equations (3.6) - (3.9) hold as equalities and imply the following known
condition:
(3.13)
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Goodwin and Holt (2002) show that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and
consumption of good is equal to the ratio of the price of the consumption good to the wage rate.
(3.14)
Equation (3.14) implies that the value of the marginal product of farm labor is equal to the offfarm wage rate. According to Goodwin and Holt (2002), when an individual works on the farm
but not off-farm, a corner solution with wi < Pf Q Fi is implied. On the other hand, if an individual
works off the farm, then a corner solution with wi > Pf Q Fi is obtained. Assuming that the utility
function is additively separable, marginal utilities of operators and spouses are independent.
Considering the independence of the levels of productivity for both operators and their spouses,
the labor supply decisions of farm operators and their spouses are separately determined.
Solving for first order conditions yields the reduced form supply equations for both farm
operators and their spouses. The reduced form of the model consists of six structural endogenous
variables

,

,

,

, ,

and exogenous factors that include wages, prices, and

characteristics of the production and utility function (Goodwin and Holt, 2002). The goal of this
analysis is to provide estimates of off-farm labor supply decisions. A simple reduced form
modeling approach that relate off-farm labor supply decisions influence by operator’s and
spouse’s characteristics is used. Hence, an empirical off-farm labor supply model would take the
form:
,

,

,

,

(3.15)

Where the variables maintain their previous specification.
3.2. Parametric Model (Probit)
A farm operator’s decision to work off-farm can be expressed in the framework of a
discrete choice model. The response variable in this analysis is binary, indicating whether the
20

individual (1) decides to work off-farm or 2) not to work off-farm. Let Y denote the decision of
the farmers to work off-farm then the response. Y takes the value 1 if the farm operator or spouse
decides to work off-farm, 0 otherwise. Generally, the decision to participate in off-farm work
depends on the farm operator’s level of human capital, family characteristics, farm
characteristics, types of government payments received by the farm and other characteristics that
are relevant to off-farm work opportunities and the cost associated with working off-farm. Let
the vector X represent the information on all of these characteristics and explain off-farm labor
supply. In this case, the predicted values from a regression analysis beyond the limits of 0 and 1
are meaningless. Therefore, the appropriate model for this type of analysis is a probit model and
the specification is as follows
,
|

1 if

0, 0 otherwise,

(3.16)

0
|

(3.17)
1

(3.18)

where, b represents the coefficients of covariates,

.

denotes the probability density function

of the normal distribution, and Φ . represents the cumulative density function of the normal
distribution. A typical probit model can be written as equation (3.19) and the parameters are
estimated by the maximum likelihood estimation procedure. According to Wooldridge (2002),
the probit model follows a normal distribution and takes the following forms:
Φ

1
0

1

(3.19)

Φ

(3.20)

Combining equations (3.19) and (3.20) to obtain the density of
|

Φ

1

Φ

, given

, is written as:
(3.21)
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Let { ,

are n independent, identically independently normally distributed observations in

model (3.16). Therefore the log likelihood function of this model is:
∑

ln

ln Φ

1

ln 1

Φ

.

(3.22)

Hence, the estimation of parameter b is equivalent to maximization of the log likelihood function
with respect to the b parameter.
Since this research is interested in assessing the influence of each of the independent variables on
the decision of the farmer and /or spouse to work off-farm. The marginal effect of a continuous
variable in a probit model is given by:
|

(3.23)

(Green, 2008)
In addition, the marginal effect for a binary independent (dummy) variable is
1|

1

1|

0

(3.24)

Marginal effects can be calculated in two ways. The first method involves computing the mean
of the data and using expression 3.23 in order to determine marginal effects. The second method
is to find the marginal effect at each observation value and average these obtained values to get
the scalar value of the marginal effect. The second procedure is more reliable than the first one,
so this second procedure is used to compute the marginal effect of the independent variables.
3. 3. Semiparametric Model
One of the major concerns in statistics and economics has to do with finding the
appropriate functional form. Generally, functional forms are explained by the relationship
between dependent and independent variables via their probability density functions. Raw data
does not contain significant information itself; therefore, data needs to be examined from
different angles. The first step in analyzing data is to draw diagrams such as bar diagrams, pie
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charts, and scatter plots. Statistical analysis is not limited to such diagrammatic processes;
different distributional, functional forms have been introduced in the history of statistical
analysis; however, researchers commonly use three types (parametric, nonparametric and
semiparametric) of regression procedures today.
The parametric estimation procedure involves the estimation of regression parameters,
and interpretation of the estimated parameter values. The parameters are generally estimated
assuming a linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Non-linear
relationships between variables can be transformed into linear form using log function, which
makes parameter computation easier. OLS and Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) are two
common methodologies in parametric data analysis. Sometimes, the functional forms for
parameters are too rigid causing the parametric form to be inappropriate (Lee, 2001). Some of
the assumptions in OLS, such as normality, autocorrelation, and multicollinearity may not hold
so the estimators would no longer be considered as the ‘best’ linear unbiased estimator (BLUE).
Consequently, OLS might sometimes be an inappropriate functional form. In addition, if the
chosen density is incorrect, the MLE will not be the best (Lee, 2001).
The drawbacks of parametric regression can be overcome by removing the restriction on
functional form. This approach leads to the distribution free functional form known as
Nonparametric Regression. A straightforward procedure uses scatter plots to figure out the
simple functional form without imposing the restrictions required in a parametric model.
According to Lee (2001), this estimation procedure is “letting the data speak for themselves.”
Many procedures for estimating nonparametric regression are available today; however, the
procedures are not free of drawbacks. One of the disadvantages of this procedure is the curse of
dimensionality. Large samples need accurate measurement. In addition, if the sample size

23

required for analysis rises with an increase in the number of explanatory variables, then the
nonparametric estimation procedure can become somewhat tedious, and to address some of these
problems, a new technique was introduced which combines elements of both parametric and
nonparametric models into a single model. This type of estimation is known as semiparametric
model. The purpose of the semiparametric model is to balance the pros and cons of the
parametric and nonparametric procedures as described above. The main advantage of
semiparametric estimation is the flexibility of functional form. In one sense, this methodology is
a hybrid form of the parametric and nonparametric methods (Lee, 2001). Furthermore, this
procedure does not restrict the parameter, so it is able to reduce the “curse of dimensionality.”
Moreover, the nonparametric component in the semiparametric procedure captures the
nonlinearity in data. The characteristic of the included variables determines the role that either
the parametric or the nonparametric component would play within a model. Although, we can
select nonparametric variables using established theory, many literature have proposed a new
methodology in order to test the nature of independent variables.
3.3.1. Development of Semiparametric Model
The nonparametric statistical method has been used in economic research since the
1960’s, but researchers have widely used since the 1990s. Fan and Gijbels (1992) propose a
nonparametric method for estimating the mean regression function, which combines the ideas of
a local linear smoother and variable bandwidth. They approach a new minimization of the mean
integrated square error for variable bandwidth selection. Generally, there are two types of
variables: categorical and continuous. Earlier analyses are based upon just a single variable type,
but in this research there are both categorical and continuous variable types i.e. rank, binary and
continuous data, which have been simultaneously censored. Through implementation of local
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linear kernel estimation, Lewbell and Linton (2002) constructed a nonparametric censored and
truncated regression model as a latent regression function, which is consistent and asymptotically
and normally distributed.
Economics is a social science; so many regressors like family size, gender, etc., often
come in the form of categorical variables. It is easy to perform statistical analysis if all variables
are continuous; however, mixed data that consists of both categorical and continuous data are
tedious to manipulate in semiparametric regression compared to parametric regression analysis.
Many authors have proposed new methodologies to account for this phenomenon. For example,
Racine and Li (2004) proposed a new methodology of nonparametric regression estimation for
both categorical and continuous data. Using kernels along with the cross validation method as a
choosing procedure for smoothing parameters, they show that their new estimator performs
much better than conventional nonparametric estimators in the presence of mixed data. Blundell
and Powell (2004) developed and implemented a single-index binary response model for
estimating binary response models with continuous endogenous regressors. They show that
semiparametric estimators work well in contrasting probit and linear probability models, and in
detecting for significant attenuation bias. Furthermore, multivariate-based distributions used in
economic research, is another difficulty in the semiparametric estimation procedure. To account
for this phenomenon, Chen and Fan (2006) suggest a Copula-based semiparametric stationary
Markov model characterized by a parametric copula and a nonparametric marginal distribution.
A copula serves a heuristic in constructing a multivariate regression and represents general types
of dependence. Bickel, Ritov and Stoker (2006) constructed a score test, a new framework for
general semiparametric hypotheses that has a nontrivial power on the
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scale in every direction.

Likewise, the Simar and Wilson (2007) approach is a coherent data-generating process which is
utilized by implementing a single and double bootstrap procedure.
Recently, semiparametric functional estimation techniques such as the kernel method
have been used to construct consistent model specification tests. Statisticians Robinson (1988),
Hong and White (1995) generated the idea of testing parametric and semiparametric regression
models. Similarly, Hardle and Mammen (1993) suggest the use of the wild bootstrap procedure.
Blundell, Duncan, Pendakur (1998) introduced a specification testing procedure for determining
the endogeneity of variables by implementing semiparametric methods in an Engel curve
relationship using British family expenditure survey data. They also discussed a useful method
for pooling nonparametric Engel curves across households with different demographic
compositions. Recently, Hsiao, Li and Racine (2007) proposed using a nonparametric kernelbased model specification test for mixed data (discrete and continuous) by means of using the
cross-validation method. Using simulation results, they found that the proposed test has a
significant advantage over other conventional frequency based kernel tests.
3.3.2. Semiparametric Smoother
In the semiparametric regression procedure, the regression consists of two forms: a parametric
and a nonparametric form. The parametric procedure is simple and straightforward if the relevant
variables are available and the appropriate functional form is known, but I have to consider
different factors in the nonparametric procedure. The main aim of nonparametric regression is in
the smoothing response variables that stem from one or more of the dependent variable. In
practice, continuous variables are used to smooth dependent variables with few assumptions
about functional forms of nonlinearity (Keele, 2008). The semiparametric regression procedure
is often called additive or Generalized Additive Model (GAM). A smoothing spline and/or a
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Kernel smoother are two common tools used for smoothing in both non- and semiparametric
models.
3.3.2.1. Kernel Smoother
A kernel smoother is a weighting function used in a kernel regression to estimate the conditional
expectation of random variables. The function is denoted by K(u) and satisfies the following
properties
i

K u du

ii K u
iii

K

1

(3.25)

u

(3.26)

u K u du

k

0

(3.27)

The kernel function is a consistent estimator of nonparametric component

and the

symmetry condition (ii) implies that
u K u du

0

(3.28)

According to Silverman (1986), the kernel estimator with kernel K is defined as
f x

1/nh ∑

K

(3.29)

where h denotes bandwidth, which is generally described as a smoothing parameter
(Silverman, 1986). The kernel function determines the shape of the bumps while the bandwidth
determines their width. In general, there are six types of kernel functions (Silverman, 1986), and
they are the Uniform, Epanechnikov, Biweight, Triangular, Gaussian and Rectangular. Each
density function and its associated efficiency are shown in Table 3.1.
Another fundamental part of nonparametric statistics is the selection of an appropriate
smoothing parameter. If the smoothing parameter (bandwidth h for kernel smoothing) is small,
the resulting estimator will have a small bias but a large variance. On the other hand, if h is large,
the resulting estimator will have a large bias but small variance. Therefore, in empirical work,
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deciding upon the most appropriate smoothing value involves a trade-off between variance and
bias. Optimal bandwidth is obtained by the minimizing the Integrated Mean Square Error
(IMSE). The detail of this IMSE procedure is available in Li and Racine (2007). There are
mainly two principal methods for bandwidth selection: (1) Rule of Thumb or Plug-In Method,
and (2) Cross-Validation Methods. A detailed procedure for computing optimal bandwidth is
available in Li and Racine (2007),
Table 3.1. Different Types of Kernel Smoothers
Kernel
K(t)
Epanechnikov

for |t|

√

Efficiency
√5.

Otherwise
1
for | | 1
0
Otherwise
| | 1,
1 | |
0
Otherwise

1

0

Biweight
Triangular
Gaussian

√

Rectangular

0.9859
0.9512

e
1
2

0.9939

| |

1, 0

0.9295

Source: Silverman (1986)
3.3.2.2 Smoothing Spline
The smoothing spline method depends upon minimizing the residual sum of squares
between a response variable y and the nonparametric estimate,

). The Residual Sum of

Squares (RSS) for one variable is given by
∑

.

(3.30)

When there is more than one independent variable, the spline smoothing needs to be penalized
by a factor. Therefore, the minimization of RSS is subject to the penalty for the number of local
parameters used for spline smoothing (Keele 2008). The penalty for spline models is

l

(Wood, 2006). This term is also known as a roughness penalty constraint. The
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first part, l, is the smoothing parameter, and the second term, which consists of the second
derivative of

, measures the rate of change of function, so the high value of second

derivative imply the high curvature and vice versa. In another words, the Hessian matrix
measures the amount of curvature around the likelihood maximum (Keele, 2008). Thus, a spline
estimate is given by the minimization of the following expression.
,l

∑

l

.

(3.31)

where, spline smoothing is to minimize the sum of squares between y and the nonparametric
estimate. The term f(x) is subject to a penalty factor l , which represents the smoothing
parameter. Similar to kernel estimators, a very small value for l gives over fitting close to data
and a large l value produce a least square fit. Therefore, I need to find an appropriate smoothing
value that fits the semiparametric regression model well. Selection criteria of the smoother in
semiparametric model are given in section 3.3.5.
3.3.3. Semiparametric (Generalized Additive Regression) Model
Statisticians and economists propose different types of semiparametric models includes
the (1) Single Index Model, (2) Multiple Index Model, (3) General Additive Model, (4) Partial
Linear Model and (5) Smooth Coefficient Model. Literately few kernel based semiparametric
models are used in agricultural economics; however, the spline based semiparametric model is
very rare in this field. To illustrate, Robert and Key (2008) used generalized additive model in
the study of agricultural payments and land concentration in the United States, and find that
semiparametric models account strong association between government payments and
concentration of cropland and farmland. This research applies a semiparametric regression called
a Generalized Additive Model (Hastie and Tibshirani, 1990). Likewise, this research is interested
to utilize a General Additive Model to account nonlinearity in off-farm labor supply model. The
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semiparametric additive model with nonparametric and parametric terms and takes the following
form:
(3.32)
In this model, the covariate X is assumed to have a linear effect. The covariates Xji are non-linear
covariates and are fitted by a nonparametric estimation procedure. The parametric part of the
model allows for the existence of discrete independent variables, such as dummy variables. The
nonparametric terms; however, contain only continuous covariates. This model can be solved by
using the penalized likelihood maximization method. Iterative algorithmic procedures are
required for parameter estimation of this model. A description of this estimation procedure is
available in Wood (2006); Following Wood (2006), the semiparametric generalized additive
model can be written as
(3.33)
where

and

~ is ‘an exponential family distribution’;

is a known, monotonic and

twice differentiable link function (a probit). Xi is the ith row of parametric model matrix, with
parameter vectors b, and fi serving as smoothing functions for the nonparametric covariates xj.
To estimate the model specified in equation (3.33), I specify the basis, bji, for each smooth
function, so that the smooth function can be represented as
∑

, and implies

.

Suppose

(3.34)
(3.35)

, then S is called the penalty matrix for the basis. where B and D are the basis function and
matrices used to define a regression spline as shown in Table 4.2 of Wood (2006);
of nonparametric components,

are vectors

are coefficients of the smooth function and, of which, are

required to be estimated in this model. Using a basis, I can create the model matrix
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And
,

,…,

, that implies
(3.36)

Wood (2006) has shown that equation (3.36) can be reparameterized subject to the
0, such that for any

constraint1
1

1 , the orthogonal column matrix Z satisfies

0. After the reparameterization, the new parameter

and new model matrix

satisfy

the following two conditions:
and

;Then

(3.37)
(3.38)

,

Where,

,

, … . Hence, equation (3.38) is similar to a parametric generalized linear

model and estimated by a penalized likelihood maximization. Wood (2006) suggests that
convenient penalties be applied in this model would be quadratic form in type. Then, the
penalized likelihood is expressed as
∑ l
where

∑ l

=

(3.39)

; l is a smoothing parameter that manipulates the tradeoff between goodness of

fit of the model and smoothness, and

is a matrix of known coefficients. Using penalized the

iteratively re-weighted least square maximization process and properties of exponential family
distribution. I can write
∑

0

(3.40)

The solution of this equation is
∑

(3.41)
31

and Wood (2006) has shown that
√
where,

(3.45)
is diagonal matrix of weight and

is pseudo data. Wood (2006) then outlines the

procedure in two steps
, calculate the pseudo data

1. Given the current

and weights

2. Minimize equation (3.45) with respect to b in order to find b
predict

,

, and fitted values

.
.Evaluate the linear
, incrementally.

In this penalized least square estimation problem, the influence matrix A is specified as
I

(3.46)

and for the un-weighted additive model
(3.47)
Wood (2006) shows that the parameter estimates after maximizing the penalized likelihood
function is:
(3.48)
3.3.4. Smoothing Parameter Selection Criteria
The criterion for selecting the smoothing parameter is to minimize the mean square error. When
the scale parameter of the distribution is known, the minimization of expected mean square error
is equivalent to Mallows’ Cp/UBRE (Un-Biased Risk Estimator; Craven and Wahba, 1979).
However, when the scale parameter is not known, the cross validation method is useful.
1. For a known scale parameter: UBRE: The mathematical form of this criteria is
(3.49)
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2. For an unknown scale parameter: When the scale parameter is unknown, I am unable to
use equation 3.48 for smoothing, as it requires value of

. Instead, prediction error is

used as a base smoothing parameter. This method involves omitting a datum,

from the

model at first and estimating a scale parameter so that the ordinal cross validation score
can be computed, and is expressed as
∑
where ̂

̂

̂

is predicted value of

(3.50)
obtained from the model fitted to all remaining data except

itself. Wood (2006) then shows that the ordinary cross validation score is
∑

.

and, the general form of

(3.51)
is

(Hastie and Tibshirani; 1990).

(3.52)

This method is called the Generalized Cross Validation Score (GCVS).
3.4. Variable Selection Procedure
The importance of variable selection in a semiparametric model process was highlighted
at the beginning of this current chapter; however, in real data analysis, it is not an obvious rule to
place covariates in parametric and nonparametric components. For example, in off-farm labor
supply, it might be logical to assume that household net worth is a nonparametric variable and
that need to be smoothing variable because a financially well-established farm households are
less likely to work off-farm. However, I need to confirm it before using it as a nonparametric
variable. This assumption needs to be validated. A statistical procedure developed by Blundell
and Duncan (1998) is used to select which variables are parametric and which are nonparametric.
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According to this methodology, if covariates are endogenous in their nonparametric component,
they are nonparametric variables else they are parametric. Let x be endogenous in the model
(3.53)
In the sense that
|

0

|

so the nonparametric estimator will

in which case

not be consistent. Instead, consider a different variable, z, which holds the following relation
0 and

with
with

/

(3.54)
0

(3.55)

Then, let us assume that there is endogeneity with null hypothesis
:

0

Nonparametric variable

:

0

Parametric variable

(3.56)

This test statistic determines the endogeneity of variables in the semiparametric model.
3.5. Specification Test
Comparison of the models on the results produced by parametric and semiparametric
model is one of the important aspects of developing a semiparametric model. Many recent
journal articles have examined the significance of the two models. For example, Goodwin and
Holt (2002) compare the Single Index model with a Tobit model using Housman test and found
that single index model is specified. In similar manner, this research compares a semiparametric
model with the parametric model of labor supply. Statisticians and economists like Hong and
White (1995), Zheng (1996), and Li and Wang (1998) proposed model specification test. The
Hong and White (1995) test which is based on residual of models is used in this study and
subsequently discussed in the next section.
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3.5.1. Hong and White Test
Hong and White (1995) introduced a consistent test of functional form via nonparametric
techniques. They set up a null hypothesis that the parametric model is correct against the
nonparametric as an alternative model. The test can is:
H : Parametric Model

(3.57)

H : Semiparametric Model

(3.58)

The test statistics T is given by
T

nm /σ

Where, m
where ̂

n

P / 2P

/

∑

n

ε

(3.59)
∑

η

(3.60)

is the residual from nonparametric estimation,

variance of the error term under

,

is a consistent estimator for the

is dimension of parameter for parametric covariates, ̂

regression error from parametric estimation procedure. Hong and White proved that as
0,1 under

. The hypothesis

is rejected for large values of
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CHAPTER 4
DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL
Data collected under the USDA’s National Agriculture Statistical Service’s Agricultural
Resource Management Survey (ARMS) conducted in 2006 is used in this study. The 2006
ARMS data set is a large data set providing a host of information regarding the U.S. agricultural
sector including the survey of household activities such as labor allocation for both on- and offfarm labor. Farm operators’ and their spouses’ characteristics like operator’s age, years of formal
education and their health insurance status are also available in the data set. The data also
provide family characteristics such as number of household members along with their ages. In
order to account for non-linearity in both operators’ and spouses’ ages, an age squared variable
is included in the model. The ARMS database contains different farm program payments,
including income, expenses and type of farms. The descriptive statistics of important factors
used in this research in labor allocation to nonfarm employment sectors are presented in Table
4.1.
ARMS collects data on hours of worked on farm and off the farm for both farm operators
and their spouses. The average annual off-farm work hours are forty-three hours for operators
and sixty six hours for spouses. This figure indicates that the annual off-farm work by spouses is
compared to farm operators is greater. Although, annual hours of off-farm work is accessible, I
create new dummy variables for both operators and spouses based on whether they supply labor
to off-farm work. In my analysis, a value of 1 is assigned if the individual (operator or spouse)
works off-farm and 0 otherwise.
Literatures in off-farm labor supply (Huffman, 1980; Goodwin and Mishra, 1997) argue
that off-farm work experience is one of the most important factors affecting off-farm labor
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Table 4.1. Definition and Summary Statistics of Variables Used in the Analysis
Standard
Variable
Variables Definition
Mean
Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Code
Dependent Variables
=1 if worked off the farm, 0 otherwise
0.30
0.46
0.00
1.00
of_op
(Operator)
=1 if worked off the farm, 0 otherwise
0.46
0.49
0.00
1.00
of_sp
(Spouse)
Characteristics
Age of operator (years)
55.39
12.03
19.00
92.00
op.age
Age of spouse (years)
52.80
11.87
17.00
92.00
sp.age
Years of formal education, operator
13.46
1.91
10.00
16.00
op.educ
years of formal education, spouse
13.58
2.21
10.00
16.00
sp.educ
=1 if the farm operator received health
0.19
0.39
0.00
1.00
ophthins
insurance through off-farm work, 0
otherwise
=1 if the farm spouse received health
0.23
0.42
0.00
1.00
sphthins
insurance through off-farm work, 0
otherwise
Family Characteristics
Number of household member under
0.15
0.50
0.00
6.00
hhsize06
age 6
0.54
1.00
0.00
7.00
hhsize13
Number of household member
between 13 and 17
Household net worth ($1000)
2177.45
7224.52
0.00 380292.25
hhnw1
Farm Characteristics
Direct farm program Payments
8610.71 24943.20
0.00 666349.00
direct
Indirect farm program payments
8900.35 27490.58
0.00 655200.00
indirect
= 1 if the farm is full owned , 0
0.40
0.49
0.00
1.00
fowner
otherwise
= 1 if the farm is partially owned, 0
0.49
0.50
0.00
1.00
powner
otherwise
crppayment Conservation reserve payments
795.57
7239.23
0.00 295923.00
Farm size, value of agricultural output
750.82
2016.56
0.00
46000.00
vprod1
sold ($1000)
= 1 if the farm has crop insurance, 0
0.32
0.47
0.00
1.00
insur
otherwise
Entropy measure of farm
0.14
0.14
0.00
0.58
entropy
diversification
Local Economic Condition
metro1
0.34
0.47
0.00
1.00
= 1 if the farm is located in a metro
county, 0 otherwise
Sample size
5144
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allocation. Unfortunately, the 2006 ARMS data used in this study does not contain any
information about off-farm work experience. The levels of education for their family members
are available and are disaggregated in this paper into four levels of

formal education. The four

categories are under high school, high school, undergraduate and graduate. The status of
operator’s and spouse’s health insurance received from off-farm work is used in our research as
an indicator variable. Both the number of household members and their age is useful in
determining the impact children have on their parents’ labor allocation for both farm and nonfarm activities. In this study, the number of children in a household is categorized into two
groups: under the age 6, and between the age of 13 to 17.
Literature also shows that household net worth is an important factors in the off-farm
labor allocation. Household net worth is a measure of the financial wealth of a household.
Further, different farm characteristics such as ownership and type of subsidies farms received
from different governmental subsidy programs are used in this research. To illustrate,
information regarding different government farm program payments such as direct, indirect, and
conservation reserve payments is available in the 2006 ARMS data. This research is primarily
interested in studying the effect of direct, indirect, and conservation reserve payments on the offfarm labor allocation decision. Here, direct payments are decoupled farm program payments and
indirect farm program payments are coupled farm program payments. On average, farms
received $8,145 in direct, $8,337 in indirect farm program payments, and $780, on average, in
conservation reserve payments. This study uses the value of agriculture production by the farm
as a proxy for farm size in this study. The status of farm crop insurance available in 2006 ARMS
data obtained by farms is also of interest in our area of research. The type of county, metro or
non-metro, were included in the data as to assess the influence of farm location on off-farm labor
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force participation. Finally, after removing some missing observations, 5,144 observations were
used in this analysis.
4.1. Empirical Model
The theoretical model discussed in chapter three suggests that the number of hours
supplied in off-farm work by farm operators and their spouses depends upon their age, education
level, health insurance obtained from non-farm employment, number of children present in the
family, and farm characteristics like ownership, farm size, farm diversification (entropy), crop
insurance. Different farm program payments they received and location of farm are also a part of
off-farm labor allocation decisions. In this research, I am interested in whether the operator and
spouses choose to work on or off the farm. Therefore, our dependent variable is a binary variable
with a value of 1 if they work in the non-farm sector, 0 otherwise. Our empirical estimation
procedure consists of three parts. First the study estimates both a parametric probit model, and
semiparametric model of off-farm labor supply. To this end, I test the specification of model
using graphical plots of the model, the likelihood ratio test, and a Hong and White (1995) test.
The off-farm function of farm operators and their spouses in parametric framework can be
written as in equation (4.1).

b

b

b

13

b

b
b

b
1

b
1

b
b

b

.

b
b

b

06

b
1

b

b

e

(4.1)

Where i represent operator and spouses. In addition, G denotes the link function. In my model, G
denotes a probit function. The variables retain the definitions provided in table 4.1. Here the
variable ofwi represents the dummy variable for the decision to work off-farm.
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As mentioned in chapter three, a GAM is utilized for estimation in this study. Generally,
the choice of a variable in two parts (parametric and nonparametric) comes from economic
theory. For example, in the study of Environmental Kuznets curve, covariate income is
considered as a semiparametric covariate (Paudel et al, 2005). Likewise, in this study, I consider
continuous variable, household net worth and the value of agricultural production as a
nonparametric component in the semiparametric model. However, I did not find strong evidence
to consider them in nonparametric variables. Poudel, Paudel, and Bhattarai (2009) used methods
suggested by Blundell and Duncan (1998) to verify that forestry was a nonparametric component
in the study regarding Environmental Kuznets curve. Following Poudel, Paudel, and Bhattarai’s
(2009) idea and the method as suggested by Blundell and Duncan (1998), the same approach is
applied in selecting the nonparametric covariate. The null and alternative hypothesis in the test
statistics are:
H0: covariate is nonparametric
H1: covariate is not nonparametric
Hence, if the test statistic is significant at a given level of significance, the variables are a
parametric component otherwise; it is a nonparametric covariate. The results of the test statistics
are shown in Table 4.2.
Generally, continuous variables are used for smoothing, so I apply the Blundell and
Ducan (1998) approach to check for the variable characteristics in the semiparametric model.
Table 4.2 shows that all continuous variables are significant at the 1% level of significance
except for variable vprod1 (the value of production). Therefore, vprod1 is a nonparametric
covariate in our semiparametric analysis. The econometric framework of semiparametric probit
model is represented by the following equation:
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Table 4.2. Variable Selection for Semiparametric Model Using Blundell and Duncan (1998)
Variables
hoffop
hoffsp
op.age
sp.age
op.educ
sp.educ
ophthins
sphthins
hhsize06
hhsize13
hhnw1
direct
indirect
fowner
powner
crppayment
vprod1
insur
entropy
metro1

b

Rho
-26.12746
-14.23304
614.22730
-28.78883
-1482.78800
116.47640
0.00567
0.00357
0.00222
-0.08888
0.00229
-1446.17200
-

b

b

13

b

b
b

b
1

Z-value
-5.67509
-4.48124
5.14686
-3.20613
-5.02485
5.21200
3.77395
5.64055
5.23363
-3.64255
0.30579
-4.91314
-

b
1

P Value
<0001
<0001
<0001
<0001
<0001
<0001
<0001
<0001
<0001
<0001
0.680
<0001
-

b
b

b

.

b
1

Type of Variables
Dependent
Dependent
Parametric
Parametric
Parametric
Parametric
Categorical Variable
Categorical Variable
Parametric
Parametric
Parametric
Parametric
Parametric
Categorical Variable
Categorical Variable
Parametric
Non Parametric
Categorical Variable
Parametric
Categorical Variable

b

06

b
b

b

e

(4.2)

Where f(.) represent the nonparametric component in the semiparametric regression.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The chapter three focused on the parametric and semiparametric estimation procedures
that are applicable to analyze off-farm labor supply in the United States. In this chapter, both
parametric and semiparametric estimation methods are used to analyze data from the Agriculture
Resource Management Survey (ARMS) 2006 on labor allocation. The results obtained from
parametric and semiparametric procedure are compared using Hong and White (1995) and
Likelihood Ratio (LR) test at the end of this chapter.
5.1. Probit Estimation Results
The probit estimators described in chapter 3 are applied to equation (4.2) using
the ARMS data. The result of parametric model (4.1) and the marginal effect of the operator and
spouses are presented in table 5.3 and 5.4 respectively. The notation (a) in the tables indicates the
inconsistent significance result for operator and spouse. The results are based on the robust
standard errors (RSS) method as RSS can remove heterogeneity among the dependent variables.
The positive sign on the estimated age coefficient and the negative sign on estimated coefficient
on the age square (opagesq) variable implies that there is a parabolic relationship between age
and labor allocation to the off-farm labor decision. This indicates that the probability of off-farm
work increases with age, but at a decreasing rate. In particular, the marginal estimates imply that
an additional year increases the probability of off-farm employment of the operator by 2.4%, but
at a decreasing rate (table 5.1). Similarly, results were obtained for the spouse labor supply.
Results indicate that the probability of off-farm employment by spouse increases by 2.7 percent,
but at decreasing rate. In addition, the probability of off-farm labor supply by operator starts to
decrease at 43 years, and the probability starts to decrease at 33 years in case of spouse.
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The coefficient of education level (opeduc) is positive and significant at the 1 percent
level of significance. In case of operator’s education, findings support that farm operators with
higher levels of education are more likely to participate in off-farm employment. In particular,
the marginal effect indicates that an additional year of schooling increases the likelihood of offfarm work by 1.7 percent (table 5.1). Likewise, results in table 5.2 show a positive and
significant effect of education on off-farm labor supply by spouses. The marginal effect reveals
that an additional year of schooling increases the probability of working on off-farm by 4.8
percent (table 5.2). The likelihood of off-farm participation by spouses is approximately twice
that of farm operators, which might indicate that spouses are more likely to work off-farm work
than operators are, ceteris paribus. Findings from this study are in agreement with the results of
Huffman (1980).
Some non-farm jobs provide health insurance to their employees, which likely attract
farm operators and their spouses to non-farm employment. To assess the impact of health
insurance, operator’s and their spouse’s health insurance status/availability is included in the
regression. The estimated parameter of off-farm work health insurance (ophthins) is positive and
significant at the 1 percent level of significance (table 5.1), indicating that health insurance also
plays an important role in labor allocation. Moreover, the higher marginal effect (=0.49) of
health insurance indicates that if an operator receives health insurance from off-farm work, the
probability of working off-farm increases by 49 percent. Consistent with the decisions of farm
operators, our results suggest that the chance of the spouse working off the farm is almost 60
percent more, compared to the spouses who does not receive health insurance from off-farm
employment.
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Table 5.1. Parameter Estimates and Summary Statistics for Probit Model of Off-Farm
Labor Supply for Operator
Variables

Estimate

z-Value

Intercept

-2.73439 ***

-6.36000

0.07510 ***

5.09000

opagesq

-0.00088 ***

-6.59000

opeduc

0.05512 ***

4.96000

1.35583 ***

25.60000

opage

ophthins
hhsize06

(a)

∂y/∂x
0.02424 ***
-0.00028 ***
0.01779 ***
0.49073 ***

0.03416

0.76000

0.01103

hhsize13(a)

-0.03501

-1.59000

-0.01130

hhnw1

-0.00003 **

-2.48000

-0.00001 **
0.06788 ***

fowner(a)

0.20781 ***

2.69000

powner

0.10984

1.48000

vprod1

-0.00023 ***

-2.94000

0.03546
-0.00007 ***
0.00000 *

crppayment(a)

0.00001 *

1.83000

direct(a)

0.00001 *

-1.81000

indirect

-0.00001 **

-2.47000

0.00000 *
0.00000 **

insur(a)

-0.23988 ***

-4.55000

-0.07509 ***

entropy(a)

-0.03071

-0.17000

-0.00991

metro1(a)

-0.01446

-0.32000

-0.00466

Pseudo R2

0.2543

Wald Chisquare =

1154.66

Log pseudolikelihood =

-2362.37

Note: * indicates statistical significance at a= 0.1 level
* *indicates statistical significance at a= 0.05 level
*** indicates statistical significance at a= 0.01 level
a indicates inconsistent significance result between operator and spouse
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Table 5.2. Parameter Estimates and Summary Statistics for Probit Model of Off-Farm
Labor Supply for Spouse
Variables
Intercept

Estimate

z-Value

∂y/∂x

-2.50541 ***

-5.59000

0.06831 ***

4.13000

0.02720

spagesq

-0.00103 ***

-6.44000

-0.00041

speduc

0.12131 ***

11.61000

0.04830

sphthins

1.74967 ***

28.22000

0.58033

hhsize06(a)

-0.30980 ***

-6.66000

-0.12333

hhsize13(a)

-0.05313 **

-2.44000

-0.02115

hhnw1

-0.00002 **

-2.35000

-0.00001

fowner(a)

-0.00532

-0.07000

-0.00212

powner

-0.01239

-0.18000

-0.00493

vprod1

-0.00009 ***

-2.75000

-0.00003

0.00001

0.50000

0.00000

0.00001

-0.83000

0.00000

0.00001 ***

-2.64000

0.00000

-0.49000

-0.00987

2.38000

0.15964

-1.94000

-0.03410

spage

crppayment(a)
direct

(a)

indirect
insur(a)

-0.02481

entropy(a)
metro1(a)

0.40100 **
-0.08577 *

Pseudo R2

0.3108

Wald Chi-square = 1256.55

1256.55

Log pseudo likelihood =

-2447.53

Note: * indicates statistical significance at a= 0.1 level
* * indicates statistical significance at a= 0.05 level
*** indicates statistical significance at a= 0.01 level
a indicates inconsistent significance result between operator and spouse
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The presence of children in the households would limit the time available for working
off-farm; because, women have traditionally devoted more time taking care of children and
performing general homemaking duties. As expected, the coefficient of variables that represents
the number of children under age 6 (hhsize06) for the spouse is negative and highly significant
(table 5.2). This result shows that the probability of off-farm work by spouses decreases with
each additional child under the age of 6. The marginal effect (-0.12) imply that an additional
child under 6 in the number decreases the probability to working off-farm for spouses by 12
percent. In the case of the number of children between age 6 and 17, the coefficient is also
negative and highly significant. This result reveals existence of negative correlation between the
number of children and off-farm labor supply by spouses. In contrast, I did not find any
significance between the number of children in the household and off-farm labor supply by farm
operators.
In practice, a financially, well established (measured by household net worth) farm may
have less incentive to work off the farm. Therefore, our expectation is that the allocation of labor
hours in off-farm work is inversely related to household net worth. The coefficient of household
net worth (hhnw1) is negative and significant at the 1% level of significance (table 5.1). The
relatively small marginal effect reveals that farm operators who have higher net worth are less
likely to work off-farm (table 5.1). Similarly, the probability of a spouse off-farm work decreases
with increase in household net worth. Again the effect is very small (table 5.2).
Table 5.1 shows that the coefficient on full owner (fowner) is positive and significant at
the one percent level of significance. This result suggests that full owners are more likely to
work off-farm compared to farms operated by tenants (table 5.1). The marginal effect (=0.067)
of full-ownership suggests that full owners are about 7% more likely to work off-farm compared
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to tenants. In contrast, I found the opposite, but not significant relationship between full
ownership and off-farm work by spouses.
In my analysis, I included value of agricultural production (vprod1) as a measure of the
farm size to assess the impact of farm size on off-farm labor supply by farm operators and their
spouses. In labor economics literature, some economists (Mishra and Goodwin, 1997) argue that
operators whose farm size is large are less likely to work off the farm. The coefficient of vprod1
is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level of significance for both operators and
spouses (table 5.1 and 5.2), indicating that as farm size increase, the probability of off-farm
working by operators and their spouses decreases, but the marginal effect is very small. This
conclusion is consistent with the finding of Fernandez-Cornejo, Hendricks and Mishra, 2005;
Mishra and Holthausen, 2002; Sumner, 1982, Lass and Gempesaw, 1992; El-Osta, Mishra and
Ahearn, 2004.
Theil’s entropy index (entropy) is incorporated in my research to measure the impact of
farm diversification on labor allocation. The entropy takes a value 1 for a diversified farm and 0
for specialized farms. The parameter estimate of entropy is negative for operators, but not
significant. In contrast, the coefficient of entropy is positive and significant at the one percent
level of significance in case of their spouse (table 5.2). This result indicates that the possibility of
spouses working off the farm increases if the farm is diversified. The marginal effect (0.15) of
entropy suggests that spouses from diversified farms are 15% more likely to work off the farm.
Widely studied, the literature of government farm program payments and their impacts
on time allocation have shown that both direct and indirect farm payments were significantly and
positively correlated with less off-farm work by farm operators (Chang and Mishra, 2008). In
addition, Mishra and Sandretto (2001) point out that farm program payment stabilize total
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household income and hence lessen the need to work off the farm. As expected, results show that
operators who received indirect farm program payments are less likely to work off the farm. This
finding is consistent with the finding of El-Osta, Mishra and Ahearn (2004). The relatively less
marginal effect of the payments reveal that farmers who receive more indirect payments are less
likely to work off of the farm (table 5.1). Thus, this findings are consistent with the result of
Dewbre and Mishra 2007; Ahearn, El-Osta, and Dewbre, 2006; El-Osta, Mishra and Ahearn,
2004. In contrast, the spouses are more likely to work off-farm with increase in farm program
payments.
The aim of farmers is to maximize their profit, which depends upon the production of
their agricultural products. Thus, they are likely to insure their production. To assess the impact
of crop insurance, I include a dummy variable on purchase of crop insurance (insur). The
estimated coefficient of crop insurance (insur) is negative and significant at 1% level of
significance. This result indicates that the probability of working off-farm by farm operators who
have crop insurance decrease compared to the farm operators who do not have crop insurance.
The marginal effect (=-0.075) of crop insurance indicates that insured farm operators are 7.5%
less likely to work on off of the farm compared to operators without crop insurance. This result is
consistent with the findings of Key, Roberts and O’Donoghue (2009).
5.2. Semiparametric Results
The results of semiparametric probit model for operators and their spouses are shown in
table 5.3 and table 5.4 respectively. The inconsistent result for parametric and semiparametric
results are indicated by (b). Semiparametric results imply that the coefficient of age (opage) is
positive and the coefficient of age square (opagesq) is negative for both operator and spouse,
which are consistent with the findings of parametric estimation. These findings are statistically
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significant at the one percent level of significance. This model implies that an additional year in
operator age increases the probability of off-farm labor supply by 2.28 %. Similarly, the off-farm
employment of a spouse increase by 2% but with a decreasing rate. Furthermore, results show
that the probability of off-farm labor supply by operator starts to decrease at 44 years, and the
probability starts to decrease at 34 years in case of spouse. These results are nearly equivalent to
the findings from parametric model.
The semiparametric results also in agree with parametric estimates for education. Results
indicate that an additional year of schooling by farm operators increases the probability of
working off-farm work by 1.33%, ceteris paribus (table 5.3). Compared to farm operators,
spouses are more likely to work off-farm if they are more educated. The marginal effect of
spouse education is 3.25, which means that the probability of spouses working off-farm increases
by 3.25 % for each additional year of schooling (table 5.4). Our results agree with the findings of
El-Osta, Mishra and Morehart (2008) that labor allocation to off-farm job is positively related
with educational attainment of the operator and spouse.
The semiparametric model also supports the findings of parametric probit model that the
probability of working off the farm is positively related with the health insurance provided by
off-farm jobs. The marginal effect (=0.30) of health insurance for operators suggests that the
probability of working off-farm is 30 percent more likely if operators receive health insurance
from off-farm employment. Hence, our result suggests a significant impact of health insurance
on labor allocation. Not only are farm operators more likely to work off the farm if they receive
health benefits but also to are their spouses. Moreover, the probability of labor allocation to
nonfarm employment is approximately 46% for the spouses if they receive health insurance from
off-farm work.
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Table 5.3. Semiparametric Estimates and Summary Statistics for Probit Model of OffFarm Labor Supply for Operator
Estimate

Intercept

-3.31700 ***

-8.00600

-0.81515 ***

0.09290 ***

6.55900

0.02283 ***

opagesq

-0.00107 ***

-8.37700

-0.00026 ***

opeduc

0.05422 ***

5.07900

0.01333 ***

1.24700 ***

24.83700

0.30637 ***

opage

ophthins
hhsize06

(a)

hhsize13

(a)

hhnw1

(a,b)
(a)

fowner

powner
crppayment
direct

(b)

indirect
insur

(a)

(a,b)

(a)

z-Value

∂y/∂x

Variables

0.05456

1.20400

0.01341

-0.02172

-0.99700

-0.00534

-0.00001

-1.09300

0.00000

0.14020 *

1.89100

0.03445

0.09635

1.36100

0.02368

0.00001 *

2.08200

0.00000

0.00001

-0.39200

0.00000

0.00001

-1.59700

0.00000

-0.17160 ***

-3.41700

-0.04218 **

entropy

-0.22560

-1.38800

metro1

0.00181

0.04200

-0.05544
0.00044

Pseudo R2

0.35000

LR Test p-value

0.00000

Log pseudo likelihood =

-2243.97900

Note: * indicates statistical significance at a= 0.1 level
* * indicates statistical significance at a= 0.05 level
*** indicates statistical significance at a= 0.01 level
a indicates inconsistent significance result between operator and spouse
b indicates inconsistence significance results between parametric and semiparametric
model
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Table 5.4. Semiparametric Estimates and Summary Statistics for Probit Model of OffFarm Labor Supply for Spouse
∂y/∂x

Variables

Estimate

z-Value

Intercept

-2.80100 ***

-6.72100

-0.73307 ***

0.07939 ***

5.29700

0.02078 ***

spagesq

-0.00117 ***

-8.19200

-0.00031 ***

speduc

0.12450 ***

11.69200

0.03260 ***

1.75300 ***

28.53900

0.45873 ***

-0.30790 ***

-6.41300

-0.08060 ***

-0.04920 *

-2.24500

-0.01288

-0.00001 **

-2.64800

-0.09490

-1.30400

-0.02484

-0.03889

-0.56600

-0.01018

0.00001

0.60500

0.00000

0.00001

0.11900

0.00000

-2.04400

0.00000

0.05337

1.08600

0.01397

0.26530

1.60100

0.06945

-0.06467

-1.50400

-0.01693

spage

sphthins
hhsize06

(a)

hhsize13

(a)

hhnw1

(a)
(a)

fowner

powner
crppayment

(a)

direct
indirect
insur

(a)

(a)

entropy

(b)

metro1(b)

0.00001 *

Pseudo R2

0.39200

LR Test p-value

0.00000

Log pseudo likelihood =

0.00000 *

-2374.51900

Note: * indicates statistical significance at a= 0.1 level
* * indicates statistical significance at a= 0.05 level
*** indicates statistical significance at a= 0.01 level
a indicates inconsistent significance result between operator and spouse
b indicates inconsistence significance results between parametric and semiparametric
model
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Similar result are found in the case of the number of children in the farm household. The
coefficient for number of children under age 6 (hhsize06) is positive and coefficient of children
between the ages of 13 and 17 (hhsize13) is negative (table 5.3), but only significant in this case
for spouse (table 5.4). This finding suggests that increase in number of children under age
seventeen, decreases the likelihood of off-farm work by spouses. Moreover, the probability of
working off-farm by farm spouses decreases by 8% for an additional child under age 6.
Likewise, our finding also suggests that the likelihood of working off-farm by spouses decreases
by 1.28% per additional family member between age 13 and 17(table 5.4).
As mentioned in our discussion on parametric results, the negative estimated parameter in
semiparametric model result of household net worth shows that a wealthy and well-established
household is less likely to engage time in off-farm work. Similar impacts are found on spouse’s
labor allocation. The marginal effect of household net worth (hhnw1) for spouses is relatively
very small, which implies that wealthy spouses are less likely to work off the farm.
Similar to the parametric estimates, the semiparametric estimates for the variable fowner
positive and significant. This is also consistent with our finding from parametric model results.
This estimate shows that the probability of full owner operator to work off-farm increase by 3%
compared to tenants. In our semiparametric model, the positive and significant result for
conservation reserve payments (CRP) indicates that an additional dollar CRP increases the
probability of off-farm labor supply for farm operators; however, the marginal effect is very
small. The estimated coefficients of direct payments (direct) are not significant for either
operator or their spouses. But, indirect payments (indirect) has a significant negative effect on
the spouse’s off-farm labor allocation decision (table 5.4). These findings revel that spouses who
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received indirect government payments are less likely to work off-farm. However, the marginal
effects imply that the probability of spouses working off-farm decreases minutely.
Similar to parametric probit estimation, the semiparametric estimation shows that crop
insurance has negative and significant effect in off-farm labor supply. Moreover, the probability
of working off-farm by farm operators decreased by less than 4.2% compared to operators who
did not buy crop insurance. I find a contradictory result for spouses as indicated by positive sign
of the estimated parameter (table 5.4). As expected, using a semiparametric additive model I
found that the entropy measure of diversification has negative effect on operators off-farm labor
supply, but not significant. However, for spouses the sign of coefficient (entropy) is positive and
significant at the 1% level of significance. Results indicate that spouses from diversified farm are
more likely to work off-farm compared to the spouses from specialized farm. Moreover, the
probability of off-farm work by spouse’s who are from diversified farm are 5.5% more likely to
work off the farm compared to spouses from specialized farm.
5.5. Specification Tests
The univariate parametric probit model is compared to a semiparametric specification
using Hong and White’s test. The estimated Tn statistics and p-values are reported in Table 5.5.
The parametric probit and semiparametric probit model is compared for both operator and
spouses. It is found that semiparametric model is significant at the 1% level of significance. The
effect of farm size on the decision of off-farm labor supply by farm operator and spouse are
shown in figure 5.1 and 5.2 respectively. In the operator situation, the parametric model gives
prediction above the semiparametric model within the range of farm size with value ranges from
$375,000-2,800,000. Beyond 2.8 that range, two model have similar prediction. For spouses, the
parametric predicted probability curve is above the semiparametric predicted probability curve in
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the given range, which tells that the parametric curve is over fitted to semiparametric curve.
Hence, one can conclude that the semiparametric model is more appropriate estimation
procedure compare to parametric model to analyze off-farm labor supply. I also performed the
likelihood ratio (LR) test to specify correct model. The LR test p value given in Table 5.3 and
Table 5.4 provides comparisons between parametric and semiparametric models. GAM fit is
superior to parametric fit because the chi-square test statistics is 236 on 6.5 degree of freedom,
which is highly significant. In the case of spouses, the chi-square test statistics is 146 at 7.75
degrees of freedom, which is also highly significant. Similarly, figure 5.2 shows that the
parametric curve is above the semiparametric curve which implies that the semiparametric model
is better than the parametric model. In summary, our findings strongly support a semiparametric
model.
Table 5.5. Model Specification tests, Off-Farm Labor Supply in the United States *
Model
Tn Value
P-Value
Operator
41.74268 ***
0.000
Spouse
23.42644 ***
0.000
* Univariate Probit model is assumed as the null parametric model. Tn is the Hong -White
specification tests which is asymptotically N(0,1) under H0.
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-------

Parametric
Semiparametric
Pointwise Confidence Interval

Figure 5.1. Comparision between Semiparametric and Parametric Specification for Operator
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-------

Parametric
Semiparametric
Pointwise Confidence Interval

Figure 5.2. Comparision between Semiparametric and Parametric Specification for Spouse
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CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this study was to estimate parametric and semiparametric model in
decisions of off-farm work for farm operators and their spouses in the United States. In
particular, I am interested on comparing the results obtained for both parametric and
semiparametric models. Using ARMS 2006 data, off-farm labor allocation equations are
estimated for both operator and spouses using parametric and semiparametric generalized
additive model. Result from the parametric and semiparametric model were compared using
Hong and White (1995) specification test. Although, my results show that more variables are
significant in the parametric probit model than in the semiparametric additive model, the
specification test shows that the semiparametric additive model is more consistent than the probit
model. In addition, the graphical comparisons of fitted lines of parametric and semiparametric
models show that the probit model is over fitted. Therefore, our results predict that the
semiparametric model is more informative and is better suited for estimating off-farm labor
supply model.
In this study, I evaluated the role of operators, spouses characteristics, farm
characteristics, and family characteristics in off-farm labor supply decisions by farm operators
and spouses. The results confirm that operators and spouses characteristics, like age and
education are positively correlated with off-farm labor supply. This means that the more
educated farm operators and spouses are, more likely to work off the farm. Like previous studies,
I found that the number of children in a household also help to determine off-farm labor supply
for spouses. Findings imply that women are less likely to participate in off-farm employment, if
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small children are present in the household. As expected, I found that the wealthy farm operators
and their spouses are less likely to work in off-farm work.
Farm operators who received government payments are less likely to participate in offfarm employment. I analyzed three types of payments: direct payments, indirect payments, and
conservation reservation payments and their influence in the decision to work off-farm for both
operators and spouses. I found that operators are significantly less likely to participate in offfarm employment if they received indirect payments; however, their spouse’s labor allocation
does not depend upon direct payments, as the estimated coefficients are less significant. Crop
insurance is another important factor in off labor allocation decision by operators and spouses.
Research here shows that farmers who have crop insurance are less likely to work off the farm.
The finding might revels that farmers are confident to receive expected benefit from crop
insurance in case of crop loss. Finally, results from this study also indicate spouses of diversified
farm are more likely to work off the farm. In addition, I found that if the farms are in metro area
the spouse is less likely to work off the farm.
Parametric and semiparametric estimate are evaluated and specification tests were used to
judge appropriateness of these model. The sign of coefficient for both parametric and
semiparametric is quite similar except for few variables. To illustrate, I found that the sign of
direct payment (direct) and crop insurance (insur) is positive in parametric model for spouses;
however, the coefficients are negative in semiparametric model. Further the number of
significant variable differ in parametric and semiparametric model. For example, direct and
indirect payments are significant in parametric model; however, they are insignificant in
semiparametric model for the operator. These results imply the existence of nonlinearity in offfarm labor supply model, and semiparametric model captures the nonlinearity of labor supply
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model. The prediction power of the off-farm labor supply model is less compare to the
semiparametric model. Semiparametric model shows substantive effect on the inferences I make
from this model. Finally, the evidence from a likelihood ratio test and Hong and White (1995)
test show the importance of semiparametric model. Hence, the semiparametric model is a better
modeling approach in the study of off-farm labor supply in the United States. This research
introduces an alternative approach to study functional form of labor supply model, which might
be the further step of my research.
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APPENDIX 1
R CODE FOR DATA IMPORT AND VARIABLE CREATION
arm <- read.table("C:/Users/mahesh/Documents/Thesis/labor.dat", header=TRUE, sep="\t",
na.strings="NA", dec=".", strip.white=TRUE)
#House hold information are available in VERSION 1 and HHCLS 1in arms data
arm.v1<-subset(arm,VERSION==1 & HHCLS==1)
attach(arm.v1)
#House hold net worth.
hhnw1<-ifelse(HHNW<0,0,HHNW)/1000
vprod1<-VPRODTOT/1000
#Government payment
govtpmt<-ifelse(IGOVT>0,1,0)
#Operator Education
op.educ<ifelse(OP_EDUC==1,10,ifelse(OP_EDUC==2,12,ifelse(OP_EDUC==3,14,ifelse(OP_EDUC==4,16,0))))
#Spouse Education
sp.educ<ifelse(SP_EDUC==1,10,ifelse(SP_EDUC==2,12,ifelse(SP_EDUC==3,14,ifelse(SP_EDUC==4,16,0))))
#operator age#
op.age<-OP_AGE
op.age.sq<-op.age^2
sp.age<-SP_AGE_V1
#Tenure class#
fowner<-ifelse(TENURCL2==1,1,0)
powner<-ifelse(TENURCL2==2,1,0)
tenant<-ifelse(TENURCL2==3,1,0)
#Farm Organization
indiv<-ifelse(P1201==1,1,0)
partner<-ifelse(P1201==2,1,0)
crop<-ifelse(P1201==3||P1201==4,1,0)
otheror<-ifelse(P1201==5,1,0)
#Health Insurance
ophthins<-ifelse(R1264>0,1,0)
sphthins<-ifelse(R1265>0,1,0)
#Work to off-farm jobs
opmiles<-ifelse(R941<=0,0,R941)
spmiles<-ifelse(R942<=0,0,R942)
#Government payment
crppayment<-P538+P539
crpacres<-ifelse(P28==0,0,crppayment/P28)
#Direct and Indirect Payment
direct<-IGOVDP
#direct<-P520*P525/100
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indirect<-P522*P525/100+P528+P531+P536+P565
indpyacre<-ifelse(P20==0,0,indirect/P20)
dispayment<-ifelse(P20==0,0,P537/P200)
#Market value of land
landvalue<-P854
landacre<-ifelse(P20==0,0,P854/P20)
#variable for number of acree
noacres<-ifelse(P20==0,0,P20)
#P39 is acres in federal crop insurance
insurincome<-P552
inincacre<-ifelse(P39==0,0,P552/P39)
insurexp<-R732
#Net income from insurance
net.insureince<-(insurincome-insurexp)
net.inssq<-net.insureince*net.insureince
#Metro classification
nonmetro<-ifelse(ERS_FM==0,1,0)
farmcounty<-ifelse(ERS_FM==1,1,0)
metro<-ifelse(ERS_FM==8,1,0)
neometro<-ifelse(farmcounty==1|nonmetro==1,1,0)
metro1<-ifelse(metro==1&neometro==0,1,0)
#Government payment and crop insurance
gp<-ifelse(IGOVT>0,1,0)
insur<-ifelse(R732>0,1,0)
gpinsur<-gp*insur
ownedacre<-P20/P26
#Hours of working in non-farm sectors
hoffop<-P488+P489+P490+P491
hoffsp<-P588+P589+P590+P591
##Household Size
hhsize06<-ifelse(HH_SIZE06_V1<0,0,HH_SIZE06_V1)
hhsize13<-ifelse(HH_SIZE13_V1<0,0,HH_SIZE13_V1)+ifelse(HH_SIZE17_V1<0,0,HH_SIZE17_V1)
# Entropy
entropy<-ENTROPY
#Final Data
labor<na.exclude(data.frame(hoffop,hoffsp,op.age,sp.age,op.educ,sp.educ,ophthins,sphthins,hhsize06,hhsize13,
hhnw1,fowner,powner,vprod1,crppayment,direct,indirect,insur,entropy,metro1))
dim(labor)
#Save selected data in a file
write.table(labor,file="C://Users//mahesh//Desktop//Thesis I//Data//mydata.txt",col.names=TRUE)
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APPENDIX 2
RCODE FOR DATA ANALYSIS (PROBIT MODEL)

la<-read.table(file="C://Users//mahesh//Desktop//Thesis I//Data//mydata.txt", header=T)
#model variable creation
la<-labor
hoffop<-la$hoffop
op.age<-la$op.age
op.educ<-la$op.educ
ophthins<-factor(la$ophthins)
hhsize06<-la$hhsize06
hhsize13<-la$hhsize13
hhnw1<-la$hhnw1
fowner<-factor(la$fowner)
powner<-factor(la$powner)
vprod1<-la$vprod1
crppayment<-la$crppayment
direct<-la$direct
indirect<-la$indirect
insur<-factor(la$insur)
entropy<-la$entropy
metro1<-factor(la$metro1)
hoffsp<-la$hoffsp
sp.age<-la$sp.age
sp.educ<-la$sp.educ
sphthins<-la$sphthins
#final data
k<data.frame(hoffop,hoffsp,op.age,sp.age,op.educ,sp.educ,ophthins,sphthins,hhsize06,hhsize13,hhnw1,fow
ner,powner,vprod1,crppayment,direct,indirect,insur,entropy,metro1)
#check for variable
str(k)
#############################################################
#Descriptive statistics
library(psych)
disc<-describe(k);disc
#####################################################
#Parametric estimation
library(AER)
##############################################################
#probit model/Operator
##############################################################
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#change off-farm labor supply in bivariate variable as
of_op<-ifelse(hoffop>0,1,0)
#Probit model
op_probit <- glm(of_op ~ op.age +I(op.age^2)+ op.educ + ophthins + hhsize06+hhsize13 +
hhnw1+fowner+powner+vprod1+crppayment+direct+indirect+insur+entropy+metro1,data = k, family =
binomial(link = "probit")); summary(op_probit)
#marginal effect of probit model(Average of sample marginal effect)
fav<-mean(dnorm(predict(op_probit,type="link")))
me_probit<-fav*coef(op_probit);me_probit
#McFadden's pseudo R^2
op_probit0<-update(op_probit,formula=.~1)
pseudo_Rsq<-1-as.vector(logLik(op_probit)/logLik(op_probit0));pseudo_Rsq
#Prediction
pred<-round(fitted(op_probit))
table(true=of_op,pred)
#Visualition
library("ROCR")
pred<-prediction(fitted(op_probit),+of_op)
plot(performance(pred,"acc"))
plot(performance(pred,"tpr","fpr"))
abline(0,1,lty=2)
##############################################################
#probit model/Spouse
##############################################################
#change off-farm labor supply in bivariate variable as
of_sp<-ifelse(hoffsp>0,1,0)
#Probit model
sp_probit <- glm(of_sp ~ sp.age +I(sp.age^2)+ sp.educ + sphthins + hhsize06+hhsize13 +
hhnw1+fowner+powner+vprod1+crppayment+direct+indirect+insur+entropy+metro1,data = k, family =
binomial(link = "probit"));summary(sp_probit)
#marginal effect of probit model(Average of sample marginal effect)
fav<-mean(dnorm(predict(sp_probit,type="link")))
me_probit<-fav*coef(sp_probit);me_probit
#McFadden's pseudo R^2
sp_probit0<-update(sp_probit,formula=.~1)
pseudo_Rsq<-1-as.vector(logLik(sp_probit)/logLik(sp_probit0));pseudo_Rsq
#Prediction
pred<-round(fitted(sp_probit))
table(true=of_sp,pred)
#Visualition
pred<-prediction(fitted(sp_probit),+of_sp)
plot(performance(pred,"acc"))
plot(performance(pred,"tpr","fpr"))
abline(0,1,lty=2)
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APPENDIX 3
VARIABLE SELECTION PROCEDURE IN SEMIPARAMETRIC MODEL
#Using Blundell And Duncan (1998) approach
library(np)
##Test for vprod1
#Introduce Instrument variable "hhnw1"
#model x=w*pi+uhat
lm.vprod1<-lm(vprod1~hhnw1)
uhat<-resid(lm.vprod1)
#plm
bw.vprod1<-npplregbw(hoffop~uhat|vprod1)
np_vprod1<-npplreg(bw.vprod1,residuals=TRUE)
t_test<-np_vprod1$xcoef/np_vprod1$xcoeferr
np_vprod1$xcoef
t_test
##Test for hhnw1
#Introduce Instrument variable "vprod1"
#model x=w*pi+uhat
lm.hhnw1<-lm(hhnw1~vprod1)
uhat.hhnw1<-resid(lm.hhnw1)
#plm
bw.hhnw1<-npplregbw(hoffop~uhat.hhnw1|hhnw1)
np_hhnw1<-npplreg(bw.hhnw1,residuals=TRUE)
t_hhnw1<-np_hhnw1$xcoef/np_hhnw1$xcoeferr
np_hhnw1$xcoef
t_hhnw1
##Test for hhnw1
#Introduce Instrument variable "vprod1"
#model x=w*pi+uhat
lm.hhnw1<-lm(hhnw1~vprod1)
uhat.hhnw1<-resid(lm.hhnw1)
bw.hhnw1<-npplregbw(hoffop~uhat.hhnw1|hhnw1)
np_hhnw1<-npplreg(bw.hhnw1,residuals=TRUE)
t_hhnw1<-np_hhnw1$xcoef/np_hhnw1$xcoeferr
np_hhnw1$xcoef
t_hhnw1
##Test for op.age
#Introduce Instrument variable "vprod1"
#model x=w*pi+uhat
lm.op.age<-lm(op.age~vprod1)
uhat.op.age<-resid(lm.op.age)
bw.op.age<-npplregbw(hoffop~uhat.op.age|op.age)
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np_op.age<-npplreg(bw.op.age,residuals=TRUE)
t_op.age<-np_op.age$xcoef/np_op.age$xcoeferr
np_op.age$xcoef
t_op.age
##Test for opmiles
#Introduce Instrument variable "vprod1"
#model x=w*pi+uhat
lm.opmiles<-lm(opmiles~vprod1)
uhat.opmiles<-resid(lm.opmiles)
bw.opmiles<-npplregbw(hoffop~uhat.opmiles|opmiles)
np_opmiles<-npplreg(bw.opmiles,residuals=TRUE)
t_opmiles<-np_opmiles$xcoef/np_opmiles$xcoeferr
np_opmiles$xcoef
t_opmiles
##Test for direct
#Introduce Instrument variable "vprod1"
#model x=w*pi+uhat
lm.direct<-lm(direct~vprod1)
uhat.direct<-resid(lm.direct)
bw.direct<-npplregbw(hoffop~uhat.direct|direct)
np_direct<-npplreg(bw.direct,residuals=TRUE)
t_direct<-np_direct$xcoef/np_direct$xcoeferr
np_direct$xcoef
t_direct
##Test for indirect
#Introduce Instrument variable "vprod1"
#model x=w*pi+uhat
lm.indirect<-lm(indirect~vprod1)
uhat.indirect<-resid(lm.indirect)
bw.indirect<-npplregbw(hoffop~uhat.indirect|indirect)
np_indirect<-npplreg(bw.indirect,residuals=TRUE)
t_indirect<-np_indirect$xcoef/np_indirect$xcoeferr
np_indirect$xcoef
t_indirect
#Test for entropy
#Introduce Instrument variable "vprod1"
#model x=w*pi+uhat
lm.entropy<-lm(entropy~vprod1)
uhat.entropy<-resid(lm.entropy)
bw.entropy<-npplregbw(hoffop~uhat.entropy|entropy)
np_entropy<-npplreg(bw.entropy,residuals=TRUE)
t_entropy<-np_entropy$xcoef/np_entropy$xcoeferr
np_entropy$xcoef
t_entropy
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##Test for hhsize06
#Introduce Instrument variable "vprod1"
#model x=w*pi+uhat
lm.hhsize06<-lm(hhsize06~vprod1)
uhat.hhsize06<-resid(lm.hhsize06)
bw.hhsize06<-npplregbw(hoffop~uhat.hhsize06|hhsize06)
np_hhsize06<-npplreg(bw.hhsize06,residuals=TRUE)
t_hhsize06<-np_hhsize06$xcoef/np_hhsize06$xcoeferr
np_hhsize06$xcoef
t_hhsize06
##Test for hhsize13
#Introduce Instrument variable "vprod1"
#model x=w*pi+uhat
lm.hhsize13<-lm(hhsize13~vprod1)
uhat.hhsize13<-resid(lm.hhsize13)
bw.hhsize13<-npplregbw(hoffop~uhat.hhsize13|hhsize13)
np_hhsize13<-npplreg(bw.hhsize13,residuals=TRUE)
t_hhsize13<-np_hhsize13$xcoef/np_hhsize13$xcoeferr
np_hhsize13$xcoef
t_hhsize13
##Test for op.educ
#Introduce Instrument variable "vprod1"
#model x=w*pi+uhat
lm.op.educ<-lm(op.educ~vprod1)
uhat.op.educ<-resid(lm.op.educ)
bw.op.educ<-npplregbw(hoffop~uhat.op.educ|op.educ)
np_op.educ<-npplreg(bw.op.educ,residuals=TRUE)
t_op.educ<-np_op.educ$xcoef/np_op.educ$xcoeferr
np_op.educ$xcoef
t_op.educ
##Test for crppayment
#Introduce Instrument variable "vprod1"
#model x=w*pi+uhat
lm.crppayment<-lm(crppayment~vprod1)
uhat.crppayment<-resid(lm.crppayment)
bw.crppayment<-npplregbw(hoffop~uhat.crppayment|crppayment)
np_crppayment<-npplreg(bw.crppayment,residuals=TRUE)
t_crppayment<-np_crppayment$xcoef/np_crppayment$xcoeferr
np_crppayment$xcoef
t_crppayment
##Test for sp.age
#Introduce Instrument variable "vprod1"
#model x=w*pi+uhat
lm.sp.age<-lm(sp.age~vprod1)
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uhat.sp.age<-resid(lm.sp.age)
#plm
bw.sp.age<-npplregbw(hoffsp~uhat.sp.age|sp.age)
np_sp.age<-npplreg(bw.sp.age,residuals=TRUE)
t_sp.age<-np_sp.age$xcoef/np_sp.age$xcoeferr
np_sp.age$xcoef
t_sp.age
##Test for sp.educ
#Introduce Instrument variable "vprod1"
#model x=w*pi+uhat
lm.sp.educ<-lm(sp.educ~vprod1)
uhat.sp.educ<-resid(lm.sp.educ)
#plm
bw.sp.educ<-npplregbw(hoffsp~uhat.sp.educ|sp.educ)
np_sp.educ<-npplreg(bw.sp.educ,residuals=TRUE)
t_sp.educ<-np_sp.educ$xcoef/np_sp.educ$xcoeferr
np_sp.educ$xcoef
t_sp.educ
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APPENDIX 4
R CODE FOR DATA ANAYSIS (GENERALIZED ADDITIVE MODEL)
#Semiparametric model/ generalized additive model/Operator
##############################################################
library(mgcv)
#Semiparametric probit
op_add<-gam(of_op~op.age +I(op.age^2)+ op.educ + ophthins + hhsize06+hhsize13 +
hhnw1+fowner+powner+s(vprod1)+crppayment+direct+indirect+insur+entropy+metro1,omit.missing =
TRUE,method="GCV.Cp",family=binomial(link="probit"))
summary(op_add)
#marginal effect of probit model
fav_op<-mean(dnorm(predict(op_add,type="link")))
me_probit1<-fav_op*coef(op_add)
me_probit1
#Log likelihood value
logLik.gam(op_add)
#plot(op_add,residuals=TRUE,all.terms=TRUE,shade=TRUE,shade.col=2)
##Likelihood Ratio test for model comparision
anova(op_probit, op_add, test="Chisq")
##############################################################
#Semiparametric model/ generalized additative model/Spouse
##############################################################
#Semiparametric probit
sp_add<-gam(of_sp~sp.age +I(sp.age^2)+ sp.educ + sphthins + hhsize06+hhsize13 +
hhnw1+fowner+powner+s(vprod1)+crppayment+direct+indirect+insur+entropy+metro1,omit.missing =
TRUE,gcv=TRUE, method="GCV.Cp ,family=binomial(link="probit"))
summary(sp_add)
#marginal effect of probit model
fav_sp<-mean(dnorm(predict(sp_add,type="link")))
me_probit1<-fav_sp*coef(sp_add)
me_probit1
#Log likelihood value
logLik.gam(sp_add)
#plot(sp_add,residuals=TRUE,all.terms=TRUE,shade=TRUE,shade.col=2)
##Likelihood Ratio test for model comparision
anova(sp_probit, sp_add, test="Chisq")
###################################################
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APPENDIX 5
MODEL COMPARISONS
#Specification test(Hong and White 1995)
##################################
#Operator
n<-nrow(k)
uhat_op<-resid(op_probit)
uhat_sp<-resid(sp_probit)
vhat_op<-resid(op_add)
vhat_sp<-resid(sp_add)
s_op<-var(uhat_op)
s_sp<-var(uhat_sp)
#Mn_op<-1/n*sum(uhat_op,vhat_op)
#Mn_op<-cov(uhat_op,vhat_op)
Mn_op<-1/length(uhat_op)*(sum(uhat_op^2)-sum(vhat_op^2))
Mn_sp<-1/length(uhat_sp)*(sum(uhat_sp^2)-sum(vhat_sp^2))
Pn_op<-length(op_probit$coef)
Pn_sp<-length(sp_probit$coef)
Tn_op<-(2*Pn_op)^(-1/2)*((n*Mn_op/s_op)-Pn_op)
Tn_sp<-(2*Pn_sp)^(-1/2)*((n*Mn_sp/s_sp)-Pn_sp)
Tn_op
Tn_sp
Pval <- function(z){abz<-abs(z);norm<-pnorm(abz);p<-2*(1-norm);p}
Pval(Tn_op)
Pval(Tn_sp)
##########################
#Plotting parametric fitting.
#predicted_op <-predict(op_probit,type="response")
#predicted_sp<-predict(op_probit,type="response")
#dim(predicted_op)
#plot(vprod1,predicted_op)
#Create New data
vp<-seq(1,length(vprod1),100)
#Average over all data
mean_op<-mean(data.frame(1,op.age,I(op.age^2), op.educ , ophthins , hhsize06,hhsize13,
hhnw1,fowner,powner,vprod1,crppayment,direct,indirect,insur,entropy,metro1))
mean_sp<-mean(data.frame(1,sp.age,I(sp.age^2), sp.educ , sphthins , hhsize06,hhsize13,
hhnw1,fowner,powner,vprod1,crppayment,direct,indirect,insur,entropy,metro1))
opcoef_op<-op_probit$coef
spcoef_sp<-sp_probit$coef
#
#Parametric fit for operator
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fitted_op<-opcoef_op[1]+mean_op[2]*opcoef_op[2]+
mean_op[3]*opcoef_op[3]+mean_op[4]*opcoef_op[4]+
mean_op[5]*opcoef_op[5]+mean_op[6]*opcoef_op[6]+
mean_op[7]*opcoef_op[7]+mean_op[8]*opcoef_op[8]+
mean_op[9]*opcoef_op[9]+mean_op[10]*opcoef_op[10]+
vp*opcoef_op[11]+vp*opcoef_op[12]+
mean_op[13]*opcoef_op[13]+mean_op[14]*opcoef_op[14]+
mean_op[15]*opcoef_op[15]+mean_op[16]*opcoef_op[16]+mean_op[17]*opcoef_op[17]
fit_probit<-dnorm(fitted_op)
#plot(vp,fit_probit)
#
#Parametric fit for spouse
fitted_sp<-spcoef_sp[1]+mean_sp[2]*spcoef_sp[2]+
mean_sp[3]*spcoef_sp[3]+mean_sp[4]*spcoef_sp[4]+
mean_sp[5]*spcoef_sp[5]+mean_sp[6]*spcoef_sp[6]+
mean_sp[7]*spcoef_sp[7]+mean_sp[8]*spcoef_sp[8]+
mean_sp[9]*spcoef_sp[9]+mean_sp[10]*spcoef_sp[10]+
vp*spcoef_sp[11]+vp*spcoef_sp[12]+
mean_sp[13]*spcoef_sp[13]+mean_sp[14]*spcoef_sp[14]+
mean_sp[15]*spcoef_sp[15]+mean_sp[16]*spcoef_sp[16]+mean_sp[17]*spcoef_sp[17]
fit_probit_sp<-dnorm(fitted_sp)
########################
probit<-function(xb){dnorm(xb)}
newdata<data.frame(expand.grid(list(op.age=mean(op.age),op.agesq=mean(op.age^2),op.educ=mean(op.educ),oph
thins=mean(ophthins),hhsize06=mean(hhsize06),hhsize13=mean(hhsize13),hhnw1=mean(hhnw1),fowner
=mean(fowner),powner=mean(powner),vprod1=seq(1,length(vprod1),100),crppayment=mean(crppaymen
t),direct=mean(direct),indirect=mean(indirect),insur=mean(insur),entropy=mean(entropy),metro1=mean(
metro1))))
newdata_sp<data.frame(expand.grid(list(sp.age=mean(sp.age),sp.agesq=mean(sp.age^2),sp.educ=mean(sp.educ),sphth
ins=mean(sphthins),hhsize06=mean(hhsize06),hhsize13=mean(hhsize13),hhnw1=mean(hhnw1),fowner=
mean(fowner),powner=mean(powner),vprod1=seq(1,length(vprod1),100),crppayment=mean(crppayment)
,direct=mean(direct),indirect=mean(indirect),insur=mean(insur),entropy=mean(entropy),metro1=mean(m
etro1))))
#Transform into Probabilities
predict.fit <- predict.gam(op_add, newdata = newdata, se.fit=TRUE)
predict.fit_sp <- predict.gam(sp_add, newdata = newdata_sp, se.fit=TRUE)
mu.fit.op <- probit(predict.fit$fit)
mu.fit.sp <- probit(predict.fit_sp$fit)
##########################################
#Plot Operator
par(mfrow=c(1,1))
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plot(vp,mu.fit.op,type="l",ylab="Predicted Probability of Off-farm Labor Supply", xlab="Vprod1",
bty="l")
title("Parmatric and Semiparametric Model: Operator",font.main= 6)
lines(vp,fit_probit,lty=2)
#Confidence Bands
lines(newdata$vp,probit(predict.fit$fit-2*predict.fit$se.fit), lty=3)
lines(newdata$vp, probit(predict.fit$fit+2*predict.fit$se.fit), lty=3)
legend(3000,0.40, c("Parametric", "Semiparametric", "Confidence Bands"),lty = c(2, 1,3), merge =
TRUE)
#Plot Spouse
plot(vp,mu.fit.sp,type="l",ylab="Predicted Probability of Off-farm labor Supply", xlab="Vprod1",
bty="l")
title("Parmatric and Semiparametric Model: Spouse") #font.main= 6)
lines(vp,fit_probit_sp,lty=2)
#Confidence Bands
lines(newdata_sp$vp,probit(predict.fit_sp$fit-2*predict.fit_sp$se.fit), lty=3)
lines(newdata_sp$vp, probit(predict.fit_sp$fit+2*predict.fit_sp$se.fit), lty=3)
legend(100,0.35, c("Parametric", "Semiparametric", "Confidence Bands"),lty = c(2, 1,3), merge = TRUE)
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APPENDIX 6
STATA CODE FOR PARAMETRIC PROBIT MODEL
*Improt data
odbc load, dialog(complete) dsn("Excel Files") table("Sheet1$")
*generate dummy variable for operator
gen ofop=0
replace ofop =1 if hoffop>0
gen ofsp=0
replace ofsp =1 if hoffop>0
*generate age square variable
gen opagesq=opage^2
gen spagesq=spage^2
*Univariate probit model for operator
probit ofop opage opagesq opeduc ophthins hhsize06 hhsize13 hhnw1 fowner powner vprod1
crppayment direct indirect insur entropy metro1, vce(robust)
*marginal effect
mfx
*Univariate probit model for spouse
probit ofsp spage spagesq speduc sphthins hhsize06 hhsize13 hhnw1 fowner powner vprod1
crppayment direct indirect insur entropy metro1, vce(robust)
*Mariginal effect
mfx
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